
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

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

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SOVIET NAVAL POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES
AND THE DECISION TO INTERVENE

by

Guy D. Holliday

March 1984

Thesis Advisor: Jiri Valenta

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The Limits of Intervention: Soviet Naval Power Projection Capabilities and the Decision to Intervene

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis considers the factors that influence a Soviet decision to use naval power for intervention in third world countries beyond their borders. A qualitative cost-benefit analysis is described for general application and several case studies are developed using "decision points" that follow from the analysis. Operational definitions of the physical assets available for use in an overseas power projection are then offered and compared against the requirements for levels of escalation suggested by decision points that can be reasonably projected to occur.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces, signed the article on "military strategy" in the official Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Over the course of ten pages only one short paragragh is devoted to the subject of "local war."

> "Soviet military strategy also takes into account the possibility of outbreak of local wars, the political nature of which is determined on the basis of class positions and the Leninist proposition concerning just and unjust wars. In supporting wars of national liberation, the Soviet Union resolutely opposes local wars unleashed by the imperialists, taking into account not just their reactionary essence, but also the great danger associated with the possibility of their developing into a world war."[1]

Though the content analysts may find the relative importance of one paragraph among ten pages of material a telling lack of emphasis on the subject of local war, this analysis will concentrate on the fact that Ogarkov included the paragraph, legitimizing local war as a part of Soviet Military Strategy (certainly as a topic deserving consideration among other matters of military strategy), and on his acknowledgement of the risks of embarking on a course of local war.

The larger purpose of this thesis will be to generate a regular method of putting a local war in context and using this historically derived context to measure the risk factors and expected benefits that might be weighed in a Soviet decision to proceed or to withdraw. To the extent that the context we create is realistic and inclusive, a tool for predicting Soviet responses to U.S. escalation and

---

[1][Ref. 1: p. 2-8] reprints this section of the article and offers the same argument for it's importance in context.

withdrawal will have been described. Finally, at a more practical level, the actual assets available to exercise policy options will be quantified operationally so that the parameters of the options available can be best understood.

I will begin with a general discussion of Soviet political goals in the Third World and the naval missions that apply to their achievement. The ideological foundations for the use of military force to support world wide revolution, then the general character of past uses of naval power projection in this context will be described. In order to clarify the limits of this analysis, a short list of the naval power projection incidents that are appropriate to this consideration will be offered.

An effort will then be made to explicate the most significant previous efforts to create frameworks for understanding Soviet naval power projection incidents. The two chosen are taken from the works of Michael MccGwire and James McConnell, who have for the past decade stood as the best known and most widely quoted experts in the field of Soviet Navy studies.

Soviet cost-benefit (or risk-gain) factors will then be worked out. The general categories used to break them out for this study are political/ideological factors, economic factors, and military factors. A series of conclusions will be reached regarding the general trends observable in the operations of the Soviet Navy during the course of the cases examined. The stakes in a given intervention will be detailed in their ideological, economic, and military dimensions. And the nature of the decision points that appear before and during will be described so that a short series of case studies can be followed through analytically with the operational and cost-benefit principles applied.

Finally, operational definitions of the military tools available to carry out policy will be developed in some

detail, and trends established so that the "limits of intervention" can be projected into the future at this level as well, and projected onto the constraints developed in the examinations of past policy.

II. POLITICAL GOALS AND NAVAL MISSIONS

The opening quotation from Marshal Ogarkov is meant to introduce the idea that local wars beyond the Soviet perimeter are not excluded from the considerations of military planners. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the Soviet military interest in local wars by examining the uses of military (especially naval) force.[2]

A. IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF POWER PROJECTION

The revolutionary cycle of Marx's "scientific theory of history" takes place on a worldwide scale. There is abundant evidence that the Soviet leadership has not renounced the worldwide revolutionary process, and in fact continues to consider itself the foundation of the world socialist community. More specifically, Ogarkov is one among a succession of Soviet military leaders who have been open in their belief that the Red Army is the vanguard of the global revolution. Marshal Grechko, then Soviet Minister of Defense, put it this way [Ref. 3] in 1974:

> "At the present stage the historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted merely to their function in defending our Motherland and the other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state actively and purposefully opposes the export of counter-revolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear appear."[3]

---

[2]The existence of a power projection mission for the Soviet Navy remains somewhat controversial, but Norman Polmar lists it as the primary new mission development of the 1980s [Ref. 2: p. 37].

[3]See also the analysis of Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott in [Ref. 4].

This analysis concentrates on naval power projection in local wars, because naval power is the most readily "projectable" in a wide variety of imaginable conflicts.

B. NAVAL POWER PROJECTION IN CONTEXT

Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov, the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy since 1956, is not bashful in his presentation of the role that the Navy plays in the worldwide anti-imperialist process:

> "The Soviet Navy is also used in foreign policy measures by our state. But the aims of this use radically differ from those of the imperialist powers. The Soviet Navy is an instrument for a peace-loving policy and friendship of the peoples, for a policy of cutting short the aggressive endeavors of imperialism, restraining military adventurism and decisively countering threats to the safety of the peoples from the imperialist powers." [Ref. 5: p. 251]

Admiral Gorshkov, of course, has a vested interest in promoting the use of military force in support of the world revolutionary struggle just because his forces are indeed the most readily available for such an operation should it be ordered. The institutional battle for resources among the Soviet military services would likely find the Navy representative promoting military intervention overseas because it requires an investment in ships, which uniquely enjoy the advantages of high mobility, endurance at high levels of readiness, and independence of operations from the considerations of violating national sovereignty or securing overflight permission [Ref. 5: pp. 235-236].

The motivation sounds familiar enough to anyone who reads the newspapers and is willing to mirror-image the Soviet bureaucratic process relative to our own. That process has merit, but one should avoid several pitfalls. In the first place, Marxism/Leninism is so firmly imbedded

in the day to day functions of the Soviet state that ideolcgy must be taken seriously as a motivator for concrete action in ways that have no analogy in American political or government life. Secondly, all Soviet military missions revolve around the central duty to defend the homeland. As the vanguard communist state in the ideological sense, and as a people many times burned by invaders in the historical sense, no mission takes precedence over the survival of the Soviet State. The Navy, then, must stake out territory under the umbrella of the national defense rubric to justify its construction programs. The coastal defense forces that dominated the Soviet Navy in the first half of the Twentieth Century are examples of straightforward defensive forces that must have been relatively easy to justify in the context above. The move to larger, "blue water" forces capable of operating anywhere on the World Ocean is usually explained in terms of the movement of strategic missiles to sea in the 1960s, and the need to defend against U.S. submarines or protect Soviet SSBNs.* Another way to justify the construction of large surface units is to point to their unique value in supporting critical Soviet national defense goals abroad.

Gorshkov goes about this in several ways. An interesting method, if ideologically unfamiliar to the western mind, is to simply redefine national defense to specifically include the defense of the socialist community as a whole, rather than simply the homeland of the Soviet State. It is interesting to note that when one compares the first and second editions of Gorshkov's own book, there are two instances in the introduction alone where precisely this has been done for the benefit of second edition readers.

---

*This is considered in greater detail below. For the seminal presentation of the "defensive" theory of Soviet naval forces, see [Ref. 6] (especially chapters IX and X).

Another well-tried method of making the case for a Soviet weapon is to point tc the usefulness of analagous weapons in the inventories of capitalist states or to even quote American or British admirals describing the value of such weapons. Several examples of this will be offered later when scme Soviet weapons are discussed in detail. The tactic that appears tc have been most effective for the Soviet Navy, however, has been to justify the need for "multipurpose" ships, which can effectively carry out a variety cf homeland defense missions, such as anti-carrier warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-air warfare, as well as significant missions in support of Soviet allies or clients in local wars. One can almost imagine a Soviet ship program manager describing the utility of the components of a weapons suite against the "aggressive NATO forces," then laying cn the frosting by pointing out that in peacetime the unit will not be wasted because it can serve the defense needs of the Socialist Community with the same weapons or the threat to use them.

He wculd be making a legitimate point. As we will see below, a large part of the function of naval forces is in countering superpower involvement. The weapons designed to protect the Northern Fleet operating areas from American carriers are obviously just as well suited to keeping the American forces away from the shores of the Soviet client engaged in a local war, if the level of committment is similar. The conventional wisdom countering this general idea cf Soviet force employment is that these same forces are needed at all times to react to American threats to the home waters and would therefore not be available for use in distant sea theatres. As we have noted, the homeland defense mission supercedes all else, but the assumption that all major naval forces will be turned to a relatively close defensive alignment when the level of tension rises is

dependent upon relative force capabilities, credibility of threats, and other considerations that will be discussed below.

C. DEFINING THE DATABASE

Before we proceed to the closer points of analysis, there should be no confusion as to what is being considered and what is not. The purpose of this study is to explore Soviet capabilities for power projection in what the Soviets call "local wars." Gorshkov defines these as:

> "...wars limited to the participation of two or a few states...(which are) limited in their tasks, the territory of operation and the scale and means employed in the armed conflict." [Ref. 5: p. 234.]

This is a handy definition because it carefully distinguishes local wars from strategic and theater conflicts for which doctrine is stiflingly abundant. Although Ogarkov notes that local wars want to escalate, they are not like other wars until they do, so there is latitude for some imaginative force planning to fight local wars and still more incentive to create general purpose platforms that can make the transition.

To focus the concern of this study still further, we will limit ourselves to those incidents of naval power projection in the Third World which have been identified by authorities such as McConnell, McGwire, or Kaplan [Ref. 7] when they isolate incidents of naval power and influence. These three sets don't correspond perfectly, but the degree of agreement is very high, and it suggests the following chronological list which will be used here as the outside limit of the data set considered:

1. Air support to Yemen (1967)
2. The June War (1967)

3. Combatants in Egyptian Ports (1967-1973)
4. The Pueblo incident (1968)
5. The EC-121 incident (1969)
6. Naval visit to Somalia (1969)
7. The Ghana incident (1969)
8. The West Africa Patrol (1970-present)
9. The Jordanian Crisis
10. The War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel (1970)
11. Extended Somali port visits (1970)
12. Air Support to Sudan (1970)
13. The Indo-Pakistani conflict (1971)
14. The Sierra Leone port visit (1971)
15. Reaction to the Mining of Haiphong (1972)
16. The Sealift of Moroccans to Syria (1973)
17. The October War (1973)
18. Support for Egyptian blockade of Bab-el-Mendeb Strait
19. Soviet sea and airlift to Syria
20. Sealift of South Yemeni troops (1973)
21. Port visit to Latakia, Syria (1974)
22. The Angolan crisis (1975)
23. The Horn of Africa (1977-78)
24. The Sino-Vietnam War (1979)

Though all of these will not be developed in detail, several will, and the purpose of this listing is primarily to help the reader develop a sense of which incidents fit into the analysis and which do not. The basic criteria for selection were:

1. Soviet naval involvement.
2. A focus of action at or near a Third World nation located beyond tactical aircraft range of the Soviet littoral.
3. At least a strong potential for U.S. naval involvement, measured by historical patterns or perceptions at the time.

III. FRAMES OF REFERENCE

The idea of scaling levels of Soviet intervention and viewing the various incidents in the context developed is not new. The two leading writers in the field have each offered frameworks for understanding the use of Soviet naval power, McGwire focussing on the differing levels of commitment on the part of the Soviets, and McConnell developing a more elegant, if still static paradigm based on what he calls "rules of the game." It is worthwhile to take a brief look at these two studies in order to understand the views of the established authorities in Soviet naval matters, and to better understand the points of departure from which this analysis proceeds. These men were chosen not only because their work is recognized as authoritative, but because they are the only experts to take up the task of applying a regular framework to the naval interventions.

A. MCGWIRE'S COMMITMENT SCALE

McGwire, in the article "Soviet Naval Doctrine and Strategy," [Ref. 8: p. 142] cites Admiral Gorshkov, and takes him essentially at his word when introducing the subject of the role of the Soviet navy in peacetime:

> "(Gorshkov cites) the necessity of 'establishing the conditions for gaining command of the sea (at the outset of war) while still at peace.' The measures he lists include 'forming groupings of forces and so disposing them in a theatre that they have local superiority over the enemy, and also providing the appropriate organization of forces in the maritime theatres of operation (sea and ocean), and a system of basing, command and control, etc., as required by their missions.' These requirements could well be used to describe the pattern of Soviet activity since 1964, when the navy first began to establish significant forces in distant sea areas, a process which is still in progress today."

But McCGwire does not have great confidence in the progress the Soviets have made in these areas, for he notes later that with the growth of detente, the Soviets in 1973 apparently decided to limit their direct participation in overseas matters to

> "...the provision of advisors, weapons, and strategic logistic support, the combat role being delegated to the Soviet-equipped forces of 'revolutionary' states such as North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba." [Ref. 8: p. 163]

This is mentioned because a major difficulty with McCGwire's analysis, and indeed with most people who tackle the topic, is that he seems to be of two minds when the matter of the actual use of naval power arises. What is the value of all the infrastructure building described in the long quotation above if the combat role has been delegated? What are the Soviets trying, or hoping to do with their peacetime naval force employment?

He delineates four "types of objectives which underlie" these deployments, and roughly scales them according to the degree of political commitment required of the Soviets. They are offered here in the same order that McCGwire presents them because he does not even ordinally rank them, rather presenting the first as the low end of the spectrum, the second at the high end of commitment, and the third and fourth as belonging somewhere in between.

1. Protecting Soviet lives and property. The example offered is the 1969 rescue of Soviet personnel from Ghana.
2. Establishing a strategic infrastructure to support war-related missions. Here he points to the development and use of facilities in Egypt and Somalia.
3. Increasing Soviet prestige and influence. This is the general category of showing the flag in port

visits, sweeping mines from Bangladesh or the Bab-el Mendeb Strait, and logistic support for revolutionary forces or a threatened regime.

4. Countering imperialist aggression. The specific examples offered are the Guinea episode in 1970 and the support of Cuban and MPLA forces in Angola in 1975.

He quickly makes the point that is obvious from the scale by saying that Soviet political commitment in terms of "risking major confrontation with the West" is low. Thus Soviet acts in countering imperialist aggression and increasing their own prestige and influence are lesser commitments than developing strategic infrastructure because it is assumed that they will not attempt to violently counter western aggression, and the influence is essentially hollow. It is in this area that my analysis will most radically depart from McGwire's, as it will be here assumed that Soviet naval forces can fight at least up to the level of their physical capabilities, and that their presence overseas represents a set of specific military threats to other naval forces and to forces ashore. McGwire makes a worthwhile point when he puts emphasis on the development of infrastructure, for the traditional limiting factor in Soviet power projection capabilities has been sustainability of ships, or anything else, away from Soviet soil. This is developed in more detail later, but it must be noted that because the Soviets no longer have access to the facilities they developed in Egypt and Somalia, one cannot conclude that they are incapable of acting with force on any scale beyond their immediate neighboring countries. This is a limiting factor, but not to the degree of obviating the need to consider what deployed Soviet ships are actually capable of when "out-of-area" or beyond home waters.

McCGwire's analysis goes on to note that the real developments have been in the provision of logistic support before and even during the course of "third party conflicts." He cites several examples from the 1973 war in the Middle East, which will be considered further in the next section, with the final and "most significant" development being the stationing of surface to air missile (hereafter SAM) equipped ships under the final approaches to the main resupply airfields in both Syria and Egypt, "as if to cover against Israeli air attack."[5] This seems to differ in kind as well as degree from mere logistic support and, if the stationing was truly significant, promised to create something larger than a third-party conflict once the missiles were used.

Finally, he suggests that the Soviet Navy is part of a policy of incrementalism, that is of "probing Western responses and establishing precedents." His point here is that Western response will shape the role of Soviet military presence overseas.

McCGwire says that his general argument requires the acceptance of two essential distinctions. The first is to distinguish between the use of Soviet naval power to insure the safe transit of logistic supplies carried by Soviet transports to support a client, and their use to prevent Western intervention against a client state. The second is to distinguish between Soviet willingness to risk hostilities with a third party state and their historic and continuing unwillingness to risk a military confrontation with U.S. naval forces. From the point of view of this study the distinctions are confusing and ultimately without merit. Again, we wonder whether there is any expectation that the

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[5][Ref. 8: p. 166]. The core of the scaling argument that he makes is on pages 164 to 166 of the article, and the unfootnoted quotations above are McCGwire's words from that section.

ships are to be considered a genuine threat. The Soviets appeared to be using SAM-equipped destroyers to escort supply ships heading toward Syria during the 1973 war with Israel.[6] These ships were probably reacting more to the possibility of Israeli patrol boat or air attack than to the likelihood that the United States was going to intervene, but little is gained from this point. There are few enough examples of anything that could be considered Soviet convoy operations to make the surface distinction rather facile. If the implication is that the Soviets will shoot in the former circumstance but not in the latter, then this paper will contend that though the conditions for violent Soviet naval preventive activity may not yet have arisen, it is by no means assured that they never will. This point applies as well to the second distinction--Soviet reluctance to engage U.S. naval forces is governed by a set of calculations based upon variables with political, economic, and military dimensions. All dimensions, particularly the last, have changed significantly since McGwire wrote his paper, and though the distinction exists, it is measurably different.

Finally, McGwire's scale is not intended to reflect the dynamics of superpower confrontation at sea, and so does not. The typology to be presented here is so intended, and has the specific goal of describing patterns of escalation that can be recognized for the purpose of predicting the consequences of decisions made by parties to the confrontation.

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[6]Stephen S. Roberts, "Superpower Naval Confrontation," in [Ref. 9: p. 201].

B. MCCONNELL'S RULES OF THE GAME

James McConnell, of the Center for Naval Analyses, provides a much more ambitious framework for understanding U.S.-Soviet power relationships in Third World crisis situations. In fairness to McGwire, the comparison should not be made because McConnell was doing exactly this and it was not McGwire's intention to create such a framework when he published his commitment scale. The primary objections that were given with regard to McGwire's scale are not applicable here because McConnell is careful to point out that he is concerned exclusively with the relationship between the superpowers, and how they affect the other's choice of action or inaction.

The analysis begins with three factors which govern the strength of the superpower's political will.[7]

1. Relative force capabilities.
2. National resolve, or guts (his word), and
3. Motivation, including
   a) Relative value of interests involved, and
   b) The fact of posession of the interest, or the "inertia of the status quo."

With regard to relative force capabilities, he makes several very cogent observations. First, that the status quo as presently perceived is one of U.S. superiority at sea, and therefore the relatively less capable Soviet forces that appear in cases of confrontation are an expectable consequence of that asymmetry rather than a lack of Soviet resolve. The important corollary, which serves the purpose of bringing the whole question into the harsh glare of

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[7]All this material, including direct quotations unless otherwise noted, is taken from McConnell's "The 'Rules of the Game': A Theory on the Practice of Superpower Naval Diplomacy," in [Ref. 9: pp. 240-278]. McConnell's discussion of the place of coercive diplomacy in the larger context of Soviet naval strategy and missions for the year 2000 appears in [Ref. 10: pp. 39-67].

reality, is that actual combat at sea is more and more likely to produce an outcome so dependent upon the minute to minute changes in ships headings, weather, equipment, and other factors, as to be unpredictable by policy makers beyond a certain level of confidence. The goal, moreover, is to "give a good account" and prevent a fait accompli more than it is to match fleets.*

Thus a more reasonable sense of superpower confrontation emerges, one that accounts for the extreme disparities in capabilities between Soviet "anti-carrier task groups" that are often described, and the U.S. forces that they are supposed to be intimidating. But McConnell does not take Cable's notion as far as I have, instead making the contradictory observations that force augmentation is usually directed against opposing clients, and that the observed Soviet aim at sea is to match carrier and anti-carrier groups. Having fallen back into platitudes just before, "...beyond a certain level--the level, as it turns out, of mutual credibility--force competition at the local level does not drive the competition as a whole..." he notes that there are no examples of one superpower rushing in forces to achieve a fait accompli. What has been seen are the Soviets arming up against the Israelis, and the matching of anti-carrier to carrier groups. He seems almost to be missing his own point, that there is indeed a point of mutual credibility at which local force levels drive the superpower competition, and that "credibility" of military capability is so scenario-dependent that the status quo of U.S. superiority is more vulnerable, and the Soviet local threat more significant, than casual comparisons would suggest. So this analysis will contend that force augmentation by the Soviets, specifically against U.S. naval forces, does occur

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*McConnell credits this notion to James Cable, [Ref. 11].

and attains a credibility outstripping the simple physical capabilities of weapons systems because of the uncertainties of constantly changing local scenarios, and the perceived status quo of U.S. superiority, indeed invincibility, at sea.

When McConnell describes what he means by "national resolve" or "guts" it turns out to be just what we thought it was and the concept is not sharpened up artificially. He does make the point that historically intervention and shows of force have represented a measure of national resolve for both of the superpowers, and that each has been sensitive enough to this to avoid intervening alongside or against the other.

The third factor in the relative strength of political will is what McConnell calls "motivation." This is really the key point of the argument, and as we will see, it suffers primarily from the confusion of "relative interests" into a three tiered concept (with the status quo and motivation), and from the unnecessary attempt to turn the concept of the protection of the status quo into a general concept when it differs entirely between the superpowers.

When McConnell gets down to what really happens in these confrontations, this is what he says:

> "If the U.S.S.R. is defending the status quo the reluctance of Washington to breach it outweighs any capabilities differential that might be in its favor. On the other hand, if Washington is supporting the status quo, its strength of political will from this source, plus the insurance provided by superior local capabilities, is enough to override Moscow's tendencies toward indifference to the fact of possession." [Ref. 9: pp. 245-246]

So although he goes on to make general statements about the "patron" in the general sense receiving invitations to intervene only from the general "client" when the latter is on the defensive "strategically," thus putting the status

quo in jeopardy, he would have done better to quit while he was ahead. As the quotation above indicates, McConnell is well aware that there is no general "patron," there are only the two superpowers, who view and react to the status quo in completely different ways. The relative interests of the Soviet Union and the United States are not comparable given a generic client in trouble, and certainly he oversimplifies when he says,

> "For most of the Third World, then, the rough parity in interests and the mutually credible capabilities act to cancel out these factors and leave 'the fact of possession' of the interest at stake as the key variable." [Ref. 9: p. 248]

The Soviet "interest" in every non-Marxist Third World country is turmoil and revolution, while the U.S. interest is in, at a minimum, the social stability that permits normal international trade and other relations. There is little parity in these interests unless it is non-interest.

With all this in mind McConnell presents a classification scheme to clarify how specific cases of Soviet Third World diplomacy of force should be seen relative to one another. It is summarized below. Cases are placed in three "divisions" which break down into seven "categories."

1. Security on the High Seas.
   a) Protection of Soviet or client assets.
      i) Sealift of Moroccan troops to Syria (1973)
      ii) Sealift of South Yemeni troops (1973)
      iii) Resupply of Syria by Soviet ships and aircraft (1973)
      iv) Angolan crisis deployment (1975)
2. Third World Domestic Security.
   a) Supporting Domestic Authority of Soviet client.
      i) Air support of Yemen (1967)
      ii) Port visit to Somalia (1969)

iii) Exterded Somali port visits (1970)
iv) Air support to Sudan (1970)
v) Sierra Leone port visit (1971)
vi) West Africa patrol (1971 and after)

b) Protecting Soviet citizens vs. an established government.
i) Ghanaian incident (1969)

c) Supporting a faction in an interregnum.
i) Angola (1976)

3. Third World International Security.

a) Supporting a client vs. an "outlaw" state.
i) West Africa patrol (1970-71)

b) Support of client vs. Western great powers
i) Pueblo incident (1968)
ii) EC-121 incident (1969)
iii) Jordanian crisis (1970)
iv) Indo-Pakistani crisis: two cases (1971)
v) U.S. mining of Haiphong (1972)
vi) Bab-el-Mendeb blockade (1973)

c) Support of client vs. a Western client.
i) June War (1967)
ii) Soviet combatants in Egyptian ports (1967-73)
iii) War of attrition (1970)
iv) October War: three cases (1973)
v) Latakia port visit (1973)

On the face of it, the organization seems reasonable, although creating a "category" to contain a single example, as he does with the three African examples from 2.b) to 3.a), seems artificial. When these three cases are set aside, as exceptions or special cases, the remaining cases can be broken down into the three main "divisions" without any more extraneous clutter than to simply note the two general types of "Third World International Security" cases

and to point out the exceptions. But even with Occam's razor thus applied, the scheme seems to be static, and to offer little guidance in the understanding of the points he has developed: capabilities, resolve, and motivation. As each case is discussed, a point is made about the sense of the status quo that was at stake, but there is not, unfortunately, a convincing sense that each of the categories has captured a single, collective notion of the status quo that includes all the cases within it. For example, the category of "Support of client vs. Western great powers" is a hodge-podge of situations. The two Korean incidents and the Egyptian blockade seem to represent a client violating the status quo and the Soviets either supporting their own flank or officially ignoring the situation. This is hardly a homogeneous grouping of "client support" cases, and the role of the Western great powers varies widely as well.

One leaves the "Rules of the Game," then, with several important new notions, such as the "status quo" and the scenario-dependence of actual force comparisons, but with a platitudinous definition of the factors in the strength of political will and a forced framework for the comparison of specific cases.

The purpose of this part of the analysis will be to cut away still more of the confusion by considering U.S. and Soviet cost-benefit factors to be totally different. That is, we eschew any hope of a general theory of patron-client relationships and consider the calculations solely from the Soviet point of view. This analysis is also intended to be dynamic, to describe how a case progresses from one type of demonstration to another, and how the reactions of the United States might be measured by the Soviets. Finally, this analysis entertains the possibility that Soviet calculations might include combat, directly against American ships and against third countries.

IV. SOVIET COST-BENEFIT FACTORS FOR INTERVENTION

As we have seen, both the experts cited considered the calculations that the Soviets make before deciding upon the level or type of naval demonstration that they will embark upon in a specific case. McGwire wrote explicitly in terms of the benefits of protecting Soviet lives and property, increasing prestige, countering U.S. aggression, etc., and more implicitly of the risks and costs associated with these benefits. McConnell, especially when discussing the relative force factor and the relative interests in the status quo, was considering costs and benefits associated with naval demonstrations by either superpower. Here we will focus exclusively on costs or risks as they balance against expected benefits for the Soviets in the calculations that they might make when deciding the level of commitment to extend through the course of a naval confrontation in or near a Third World country. The factors will be considered individually at first, but it should be borne in mind that the actual calculations made by the Soviets are certain to aggregate these factors uniquely in each new situation. That is, there will be circumstances where ideological considerations are negligible, and military factors overwhelming. In other cases, military considerations may be important, but economic constraints prohibitive.

A. POLITICAL/IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS

As the self-proclaimed leaders of the worldwide revolution against capitalism and imperialist exploitation, the Soviets find themselves with a fairly predictable role to play in the Third World crises that arise. The primary

decision is the level of involvement rather than which side to support. Their degree of involvement, of course, has qualitative measures, and from the political/ideological point of view, it has a spectrum of risks and benefits to be measured and traded off.

1. The Revolutionary "Status Quo"

As we have mentioned before, if there is indeed a "status quo" (in McConnell's sense) that the Soviet Union has a vested interest in sustaining it involves revolutionary struggle in non-communist states. The Soviet military in general has a role to play in supporting armed revolutions and the Navy in particular is well suited to the task. Gorshkov generalizes this way:

> "The invincible military power of the Soviet Union forms an integral part of the military potential of the whole socialist community..." [Ref. 5: p. 246.]

The Soviets initially saw the world broken into two basic divisions, and they saw themselves as the natural allies of the post-colonial societies whose people were, from the ideological point of view by definition, hoping to join the Socialist Community. The United States, on the other hand, was seen as the leader of the "colonialists" who would continue the oppression of these people if permitted to. The ideological bifurcation of the world was absolute in this Leninist/Stalinist view, and the inevitable struggle was not expected to end in compromise. Khrushchev introduced a more flexible sense of the complex "roads to socialism," and the possibility of "peaceful coexistence." But even peaceful coexistence "...represents, as is well known, a specific form of class warfare between socialism

and capitalism in the international arena."[9] So at this level, the level of pure ideology that has a concreteness in Soviet life that is difficult for Western minds to appreciate, the Soviets must consider the long range consequences of Third World confrontations very carefully. However flexible Soviet ideology has proven to be when change was necessary to support perceived national interests, there is a cost or risk to be incurred when an ideologically-based legitimacy is tested by overseas actions (or failures to act) that are inconsistant with stated policies and beliefs.

2. Cost/Risk Factors

The essential factors of ideological risk can be summarized as follows:

a. Perceived Lack of Resolve Relative to U.S.

If the Soviets are to make any significant ideological investment in a revolution, they must be sure that they are not in a position to see it swept away by the U.S. Interestingly, the Soviets have made little public commitment to revolutions that they see as not yet viable, or in danger of being overthrown by Western forces of any kind. For example, in the Caribbean, only Cuba has enjoyed the full benefits of Soviet ideological commitment to it's existence. Manley in Jamaica and Bishop in Grenada had Cuban support, but no public acknowledgement by the U.S.S.R. that they were revolutionary states. When Grenada fell to the U.S. and Eastern Caribbean forces, Castro took no ideological responsibility for the loss, saying that the revolution was over when Bishop was murdered, and therefore by implication that the Socialist Community had no obligation to support Grenada beyond that day. Even Nicaragua has not

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[9]Ccl. Konstantin A. Vorob'yev, quoted in [Ref. 4: p. 255].

been acknowledged as having joined the larger Socialist Community, although it has been encouraged mightily down the correct path. The risk being considered, then, is one rarely taken, and one taken only when a great benefit is to be had, as it was in Vietnam and Cuba, perhaps the only Third World states to enjoy a status that warrants this sort of ideological risk.

b. Competition from the P.R.C.

Although the Soviets do not acknowledge any competition for the leadership of the Communist world, the Chinese, since the 1960s, have independently offered the Third World an alternative source of aid and revolutionary ideology. From the Soviet point of view, a lack of resolve could create an opportunity for the P.R.C. that could be as damaging as any created for the West. P.R.C. competition in East Africa during the 1960s probably had an emboldening effect upon the Soviets, as the character of the revolutionary marketplace of ideas was radicalized by the Cultural Revolution. Chinese retrenchment has made the competition less visible, but they are by no means out of the game and they exercise the available opportunities to criticize Soviet failures of will or ideological purity in the Third World.

c. Conflicting Revolutionary Goals

The obvious example is the case of the Eritrean rebellion, which was materially supported, at least indirectly, until the Mengistu regime achieved power in Addis Ababa. The Soviets are now, alongside the Cubans, assisting the Marxist Ethiopian government in putting down this same revolution. This is ideologically confusing from a purely Leninist point of view, but the early help for the Eritreans was opportunistic, and the present policy has the larger

benefit of supporting a pan-African status quo that, among other things, recognizes the legality of colonialist borders, opposes secessionist insurgencies, and stands opposed to cross-border military actions against a recognized government of any kind.[10] Not exactly virgin communism, but a policy that keeps the Soviet foot in the African door, where it might not otherwise be given the record of success of the first wave of post-colonial socialist regimes.

d. Identification With the Unsavory

Soviet pragmatism has extended as far as supporting Idi Amin, whose reported cannibalism was probably as difficult to rationalize ideologically as was his continuing doting for the Queen of England.

The risk inherent in this sort of pragmatism, of course, is a dilution of the ideological foundations of the anti-imperialist revolution that they ultimately hope to promote. This is a genuinely felt risk, as we have noted before, without a directly corresponding, ideologically explicit analog for Western decision-makers. It is not, however, a risk that outweighs the importance of having a presence in a critical geographic location, or a position from which to pursue the establishment of a more acceptable regime at some future time.

3. Benefit Factors

If the Soviets successfully assist a Third World revolution the beneficial ideological fallout is manifest. The two main categories of ideological benefit to be had are:

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[10]A concise and informative discussion of the Horn of Africa in just this context appears in Richard Remnek's "Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: The Decision to Intervene," in [Ref. 12].

a. Validating the Revolutionary Paridigm

All their chips are riding on one great rcll of the histcrical dice. Of course the confidence is that the faces all have six dcts, but it provides crucial grist for the self-justificatien mill, and clearly must bolster the sense of security of the existing communist regimes, when the plan is seen to proceed. Communist ideology requires that it be on the ascent, and capitalism in decline. On this large scale, the benefit can be quite great if a victory over the imperialists is called for by doctrine, or if the consequences of losing would include compelling evidence that the world revolution is in decline.

b. Affirming Leadership of the Revolution

In the ideological battle with the P.R.C., the demonstratien of a willingness and a capability to assist the revclution in the far ccrners of the world, with arms if necessary, is a demonstration the Chinese cannot match. As we will see below, capabilities drive intententions, and the ideolcgical capital (if you will) to be had from a unique reach with fraternal assistance is quite great. Who leads the Ccmmunist World: the Chinese offering moral support from Beijing or the Soviets, challenging the Americans off the ccast and fighting the reactionaries ashore? If the occasion arises for this question to be asked, and the Soviets take action, the answer will be clear.

E. ECONCMIC FACTORS

Econcmics drive U.S. relations with the Third World countries as much as they do with any of the larger nations. Soviet Leninism is of course an economic theory of history. This general discussion of economic cost-benefit factors for Soviet decisionmaking in interventions will operate on two

levels. At the macro level, there is a point at which the West considers a country strategically critical to its economic system. This is not to say that a particular form of government is necessary, only that trade relations must operate on an established basis without Soviet control. The countries considered strategic in this way might include the oil producing countries of the Middle East, perhaps South Africa for its strategic minerals, and countries commanding major choke points of world trade. The Soviets are obliged to consider these countries to be essential to the survival of the West, and therefore likely to be protected with that existential importance in mind. At a more mundane level, the Soviets have to consider that intervention costs rubles, or worse, dollars. There is a limited supply of each, especially the latter, and there is a point at which the supply will not be adequate for certain "discretionary" interventions.

1. Cost Factors

The general cost factors considered here are costs for support of Soviet military forces rather than the general military "aid" programs that the Soviets engage in. With the possible exception of Cuba, unreimbursed Soviet military aid does not seem to occur in the Third World. Even the large investment in Vietnam is oriented toward support of Soviet forces, and the 1976 cancellation of war debts was the only actual grant offered until 1979, when military aid against the PRC seems to have been "paid for" with unprecedented levels of Soviet military access.

a. Hard Currency Outflow

Military forces overseas cost money. The Soviets go to great lengths to avoid buying ships bunkers or provisions overseas, unless it is from a client who will

take payment in credits or rubles, because most countries require hard currency. If an overseas presence was to be maintained at any magnitude for any period of time, it could get expensive, and the use of scarce hard currency might be necessary for some provisioning.

If the overall size of the military forces had to be increased to compensate for homeland defense forces overseas it would remove bodies from the productive side of the labor market.

b. Follow-up Costs

If an intervention succeeds overseas, a continuing presence of security forces is likely, either Soviet or perhaps client state troops. In either case, barracks, airfields, piers, fuel, etc. must be deemed worth the expenditure (if only in some larger sense), and the assets must simply be available from the economy.

In the Cuban case it was considered necessary to build a Leninist society as an example for the developing nations of the hemisphere, at very high cost in general economic aid.

c. Decreased Discretionary Resources

In a finite economy, if the budget permits only one intervention, it precludes intervention when one is already underway. One wonders how much of an effect the investment of 85,000 men and their materiel in Afghanistan had on the decision not to send troops into Poland. And here we mean only the economic effect, although there was clearly a military asset-husbandry motive to this decision as well, and it is considered below.

2. Benefit Factors

The economic benefits of intervention by the Soviets are similar to the benefits that the United States hopes to reap when pursuing the policies most often condemned as "imperialist" by the Soviets. The Soviets need to develop markets for their goods. The "goods", of course, are arms, and the statistics indicate that over half of all Soviet exports to the developing world are in military equipment. The trade is more likely to be of aging Soviet equipment that has been replaced in the Soviet inventory with newer models, but to the extent possible, the payment is in hard currency, even in the case of such desperately poor countries as Ethiopia and (until 1979) Vietnam. When hard currency is not available, either from the country in question or from a wealthy sponsor (such as Saudi Arabia for Syria), then commodities are taken in trade at below-market values. So to this extent, the Soviets have a positive incentive to intervene if the market is worth developing.

The economic advantage that might come from control of world choke points is worth considering as a benefit, but realistically such leverage would not likely be applied until a cataclysmic state of affairs had been reached. The Soviets have little to gain from restricted trade. On the contrary, as the Soviet economy becomes more and more intertwined with the rest of the world, and specifically as Soviet shipping and trade increase, their interests parallel those of the West in the freedom of the seas. And in fact the Soviets have consistently supported the principle of free access to and passage of international waters, from the Bosphorus to the Gulf of Sidra to the Panama Canal. So any economic return to be had from control of strategic straits is likely to be had only in the course of a major crisis that will result in a dramatic change in the way that the world does business.

C. MILITARY FACTORS

To begin our consideration of risk/benefit factors in the Soviet decision to intervene from the purely military point of view, it is worthwhile to return for a moment to the concept of the status quo introduced by McConnell. The status quo perception of the Soviet Navy relative to the United States Navy is that the former is considerably inferior to the latter. The consequent expectation is that the Soviets will back down in any serious, direct confrontation, and that if Soviet and American forces actually engaged one another in combat, the Soviets would be utterly defeated. I hasten to point out that the U.S. Navy is less sanguine than this about relative strength, but worldwide, among the nations who must make policy based upon a sense of who will control the seas in a confrontation at any scale, it is widely believed that if the U.S. Navy is the leading navy in the world, and that the Soviet force is not in the same league. Therefore we should consider again the argument that for credibility each force must "give a good account of itself." Obviously, a good account consists of two very different sorts of performances. The very willingness of the Soviets to stand up to U.S. seapower puts them on a new and higher level when it occurs. So the Soviets have, at the level of changing the status quo, little to lose and a great deal to gain. They also have a good prospect of achieving the gains while "losing" the confrontation on a tactical scale, in a similar sense to that in which the United States is widely perceived as having been beaten in the Tet Offensive of 1968, when by tactical military measures it was a clear American victory.

The Soviets, then, with a significantly inferior force can take advantage of surprise to use the constantly changing situation at sea in achieving a tactical "victory"

with strategic consequences. When this is taken into account, one can expect to find Soviet forces visibly inferior to American naval formations, even when they consider the likelihood of combat to be high.[11] This is not the way that the Soviets would do things off their own coastline, because the mission then becomes obliteration of the threat and the assets include land-based aviation, coastal ships, etc. In distant waters, the assets are limited to those surface ships and submarines that can be spared from the immediate coastal defense (including pro- and anti-SSBN) missions, and the mission changes to the more forgiving one of "giving a good account" at worst. A "tattletale" destroyer trailing the carrier with four cruise missiles, and a couple of cruise missile submarines to add confusion as well as firepower, together present a very serious threat of a "good account." Especially if the fact that the carrier must repeatedly reverse course to maintain a proper wind angle as well as a station is used to mask the training of weapons and put the carrier in its most vulnerable position at the outset of hostilities.[12]

1. Cost/Risk Factors.

The most critical risk in any military intervention is the ultimate expansion of the conflict to nuclear war. Ogarkov stresses this in the quotation that opened the essay. A primary Soviet goal of intervention in a local war would be to ensure that it remain local and not enlarge into a worldwide conflict. There is every reason to believe that the Soviets think that this can be done. Certainly Ogarkov

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[11]For a dissenting view, that "the overriding premise (is) that the superpowers must avoid direct clash," see [Ref. 13].

[12]A discussion of the dependence of the outcome of a naval conflict on the "precise details of the scenario" (or "scenario dependence" to use the cliche) is presented in [Ref. 14].

does not dismiss Soviet involvement; he opposes local wars because they are by definition the fault of the imperialists. Because the Soviet Union is resolute they create the dangerous conditions under which a Soviet-American conflict might evolve, and that holds the danger of world war. This danger is a reason for the imperialists not to start local wars rather than an excuse for the Soviets not to get involved.

Another basic sort of military risk to be taken is the loss of assets, including ships, submarines, aircraft and men. Each is valuable, and each is replacable, up to a certain point, should a loss occur. The thing to remember about the Soviet consideration of the consequences of losing assets is that the mission of homeland defense supercedes all others and assets considered necessary for that role cannot be jeopardized in other missions. Furthermore, a ship that is unlikely to be used effectively in a given situation should not be put at risk. These considerations were probably behind a well-known incident during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. During the course of the crisis, two modern ASW cruisers were in the Mediterranean. A brand-new "Kara" class ship, Nikolayev, was in Yugoslavia making an official visit with the Soviet Black Sea Fleet commander embarked. The ship transited directly back through the Turkish Straits on October 5, just prior to the beginning of the war. A "Kresta-II" class ship of similar capabilities transited down from the Northern Fleet, entering the Mediterranean on 27 October, but it never moved into the Eastern part of the sea, where the action was, before returning home in November. Finally, the two large ASW helicopter cruisers of the "Moskva" class remained in the Black Sea throughout the conflict. This is often interpreted as a sign of restraint by the Soviets, who could have used these units to achieve "balance" in their Eastern

Mediterranean force, which lacked ASW ships. The restraint might be to keep the U.S. from feeling a strategic threat to its SSBNs, or because, as Stephen S. Roberts suggests,[13] the mission was to counter the carrier rather than any submarine threat. This is very nearly it. The ships were valuable, but only as targets. There was virtually no chance that they could have been considered a significant threat to U.S. submarines of any kind in the sound saturated, shallow and warm waters of the Eastern Med. If they found a submarine it would more likely be one of their own. The Kresta II, in the narrow transit lanes to the west, had by far the best chance of detecting U.S. reinforcements, but this is also difficult ASW water. Having no weapons primarily designed for anti-carrier warfare, these units would have been reduced to defending themselves in any conflict, which is made the more difficult when you are the largest target. As open-ocean ASW platforms, defending the Northern and Pacific fleet areas, these ships are optimally armed and certainly needed, so their having been withheld from this conflict should surprise no one. Finally, their involvement would have had nothing but negative impact on the measurement of a "good account."

So the Soviets can be considered to withhold units for strategic reserve, but with an eye toward the likely utility of the ship in the crisis at hand. The conservative scale of anti-carrier task groups formed by the Soviets follows from the consideration that most or all of these ships would be lost, and that their function would likely be to inflict as much damage as possible in the minutes available rather than to function as an integrated, multi-purpose striking force. If the sole reason for withholding the Kara Nikolaev had been for strategic defense of the homeland, the

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[13]In the chapter "Superpower Naval Confrontation," from [Ref. 9: p. 195].

ship would have transited to the North Atlantic, where it could have been of some use, rather than back home to the Black Sea.

Another factor at risk in the decision equation for intervention is a possible loss of strategic ground relative to the West. Since we are considering here only those interventions well beyond the Soviet littoral, or buffer states, there is not much history suggesting that the Soviets have a public commitment to the use of third countries as military-strategic positions. Where they have attempted to build overseas bases, such as in Cuba, Egypt, Somalia, or by proxy in Ethiopia, Angola, and perhaps Grenada, they have met with moderate success. But their commitment to defense of their interests in these countries has been measured, limited perhaps by a lack of ideological justification for bases. Limited also by the simple lack of military means to force compliance upon an unwilling Third-World host. Presently the most strategically important Soviet positions overseas include Cuba, where the U.S. has expressly pledged not to intervene, Vietnam, where the likelihood of U.S. reinvolvement seems politically unthinkable, and on a second level the proxy involvements in Angola and Ethiopia. Air facilities in all these countries are used by Soviet long-range military aircraft.

The loss of military prestige is always a critical matter for a nation that derives its international position almost wholly on the basis of military strength. Soviets have not shown any willingness to embark on interventions in which there was a strong possibility of military embarassment, but there has been little prestige to lose in the third world, overseas situations considered here.

2. Gain/Benefit Factors

The most obvious gain to be had by the Soviets is the immediate goal of the action contemplated, i.e. the successful prevention of a coup d'etat, the successful completion of a coup d'etat, the delivery of military supplies, etc. On a larger scale, other benefits of Soviet intervention seem possible.

Although the Soviets have very few bases overseas and publicly deny the need for any, they are keenly aware of the military utility the United States derives from its bases. If the upshot of a Soviet intervention is the immediate, or more likely the eventual expulsion of U.S. forces from an overseas base the strategic gain for the Soviets can be seen as proportional to the U.S. loss. This does not require that Soviet bases replace the American ones, as occurred in Vietnam. It simply reduces the capability of the U.S. to efficiently carry out the military role it has taken up throughout the world ocean, and it also reduces the Soviet assets required to counter it. When Soviet access is granted, the benefit is compounded, and it is worthwhile to note that in each of the four cases listed above, there has been a military commitment of direct support (in the case of Cuba), proxy troops (in the African cases), or comprehensive materiel and training support directly against the United States (in Vietnam). That is, loss of U.S. influence and bases overseas is a worthwhile goal in itself, and where a military commitment of some relatively profound type is made, the gains to be had are most significant.

A moment should be taken here to point out that each of these places is of considerable strategic value to the Soviet military. Vietnam, of course, is within long-range aircraft range of the entire South and East China Seas (and consequently the whole coast of the PRC), the whole

Philippine archipelago, the Strait of Malacca and other trade routes, etc. Air access to Cuba and Angola permit aircraft to cover virtually the entire Atlantic Ocean, to the Cape of Good Hope, even when originating in the Soviet Northern Fleet. Ethiopian-based aircraft can cover the Northern Indian Ocean. These aircraft, of course, can engage in reconnaissance, ASW, or even anti-ship strikes with cruise missiles.

It is worthwhile to note that holes in worldwide coverage exist in the Southern Indian Ocean, Southern Pacific Ocean, and the Mediterranean. The value of a reconnaissance and strike capability in the Mozambique Channel or the capes off South Africa suggest that continuing pressure and even military intervention of some sort might be used in the general area, to include Mozambique, Mauritius, the Seychelles, the Malagasy Republic, etc. Libya and Syria are the most likely candidates for basing rights in the Mediterrenean, and the South Pacific simply doesn't have a great deal of strategic significance anymore.

Another benefit to be had from a successful military intervention would be the increase in military prestige and international respect as a military power. We have considered the value this has in toppling the status quo sense of Soviet power relative to American, but it would also build Soviet credibility in the Third World as a viable threat or protector. Various authors on the Soviet and U.S. side write of the coercive effects of naval formations off the coastlines of small countries. If that force has no history of intervention and no particular capability for it based on the ships in the force, one wonders how serious a threat it can be. Once the Soviets establish themselves as an interventionary power, their credibility will climb to another plane and the coercive value of each ship will increase. That is, one ship from a navy that intervened successfully

in a small country might be as persuasive as several from a country that never has, at least it might in the mind of the leader of a small country.

Finally, there is a positive value in getting combat experience for military forces. The Soviets pay very close attention to the lessons of history, and one of them is that combat-seasoned troops fight better than green troops. The Soviet Union has not engaged in large scale combat[14] other than the Afghan War since World War II. Except for the unfortunate example of the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, there is no history of major Soviet naval battles since the advent of steam. To a certain extent the lessons of the battles of other countries can be adopted, but they must first be filtered hypothetically through the Marxist-Leninist paradigm, which results in several stages of removal from the circumstances of the actual engagement before the lesson is uncovered. The military leaders in the Soviet Union would likely appreciate the superiority of direct experience in testing the correctness of their military plans.

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[14]One might be able to argue that the suppression of Hungary in 1956 featured combat on a large scale, but it was orders of magnitude less than the Afghan experience and different in kind from the sort of third-world intervention beyond the Soviet littoral that is being considered here.

V. PATHS OF INTERVENTION--A DECISION POINT TYPOLOGY

The purpose of this section will be to illustrate some of the general trends to be found in examining Soviet naval activity in the Third World, examine the stakes involved historically, using the cost-benefit analysis we developed earlier, and then use several case studies to break out a set of general principles through which the decisions that the Soviets have made can be compared, analyzed, and better understood.

A. GENERAL TRENDS

The general set of incidents that we are using here consists of a wide variety of situations. Both McGwire and McConnell have been taken to task for trying to sensibly organize the group, largely because their organizational schemes were static and somewhat arbitrary. Having said this, an obligation to provide a positive alternative is incurred, and so one is offered.

Tables I and II, which are basically the McConnell list with a few additions and deletions, are given in a strictly chronological order with some key operational questions answered for purposes of easy comparison. Chronological order is chosen because it is naturally given and because it would best illustrate how operational characteristics build upon one another as a result of experience, if they do. I contend here that they do indeed, and that previous experience with a tactic contributes to the options available in the next crisis. How this works is not as obvious as it appears at first blush.

The questions across the top of the tables are meant to ask, in order, whether the U.S. Navy presented a countering force (USN?), whether the Soviet Navy presented an anti-carrier warfare threat to U.S. forces (ACW?), whether a Soviet air or sealift was a part of the operation, whether the Soviet Naval Infantry was involved (SNI?), whether a proxy force was being assisted in carrying out Soviet combat goals (PROXY?), and if the operation featured a new aspect of Soviet response (NEW?).

To help with the overview it is useful to point out that in every case where the U.S. sent ships, they were on scene before the Soviet ships.

The June War is chosen as a natural starting point here (as in McConnell) because it represents the first large-scale Soviet naval response to an incident beyond their borders. The visits to Egyptian ports by Soviet combatants after the war were probably the most dangerous activities ever engaged in by deployed Soviet forces, as their purpose was to deter Israeli air attacks with the threat of raising the stakes of the conflict, a dubious notion against the most restrained adversary, which Israel is not. The air ACW engaged in by the Soviets after the Pueblo incident was a practice raid by Soviet naval missile bombers against the large U.S. force that was generated in the Sea of Japan after the North Korean attack. Interestingly, this was not done against the even larger force that responded to the shooting down of the U.S.A.F. EC-121 reconnaissance plane a year later. In that case, though, similar aircraft performed reconnaissance of TF-71 (four U.S. carriers and fifty other combatants) in the East China Sea two days before they entered the Sea of Japan.

The Jordanian crisis of 1971 is very important because it represents the first time that Soviet ships functioned tactically as credible anti-carrier groups, as we will see

TABLE I

Operational Characteristics of Naval Incidents--to 1972

INCIDENT	USN?	ACW?	AIRLIFT?	SEALIFT?	SNI?	PROXY?	NEW?
1967 June War	yes	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes*
	(*First rapid ship reinforcement in Med.)						
1967 Sov. ships in Egyptian ports	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First use of ships as escalation hostages)						
1968 Pueblo inc.	yes	AIR	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First air ACW exercising Badgers vs. US ships)						
1969 Ghanain inc.	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First Soviet deployment off West Africa)						
1969 EC-121 downed	yes	no	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First Bear/Badger reconnaisance in E. China Sea)						
69-70 Somali ptvsts	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First support for internally threatened regime)						
1970 Jordan crisis	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First formation of functional ACW groupings)						
since 1970 West Africa Patrol	no	no	no	no	yes	no	yes*
	(*First use of SNI to bolster a weak regime)						
1971 Indo-Pak war	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First attempt at preemptive Soviet deployment?)						
1972 Haiphong mining	yes	yes?	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*SSGNs primary ACW force, but did not close)						

TABLE II

Operational Characteristics of Naval Incidents--Post 1972

INCIDENT	USN?	ACW?	AIRLIFT?	SEALIFT?	SNI?	PROXY?	NEW?
1973 Sealift of Morocccans	no	no	no	yes	yes	no(?)	yes*
	(*First use of Amphib ship for third country troops)						
1973 Sealift in S. Yemen	no	no	no	yes	yes	no(?)	yes*
	(*First sealift of insurgents vs. pro-West regime)						
1973 October War	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no
1974 Latakia portvisit	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
1975-6 Angolan intervention	no	prep	yes	yes	yes	Cuban	yes*
	(*First large proxy intervention. Poss NGFS)						
1977-8 Ethiopian intervention	no	no	yes	yes	yes	Cuban	no
1979 Sino-Viet War	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes*
	(*First defense of ally vs. PRC)						
1979 Minsk transit	no	no	no	no	yes	no	yes*
	(*First Ivan Rogov demos. First exercises off S. Africa)						
1982-3 Seychelles portvisits	no	no	no	no	yes	no	no
1983-4 Novorossisk transit	no	no	no	no	yes	no	no

below. It is also interesting that the posturing at sea continued for a month after the Syrian tanks were repelled and the immediate cause of the crisis was over.

The West African deployments began with Ghana in 1969, a case of Soviet pressure to return seized Soviet fishing ships. They became regular in the form of the "West Africa Patrol" the next year, have matured considerably over the past decade and a half, particularly in the use of the Soviet Naval Infantry as a standing force off the coast.

The Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 might represent a Soviet attempt to preempt the U.S. Navy in their deployment, a new notion that will be explored in more detail below, and unique if true. In the response to the mining of Haiphong, the Soviets made their primary ACW force a group of four Echo-II submarines, which remained at anchor near the Macclesfield Bank, and did not engage in exercise activity against the very large (six carrier) U.S. force in the Tonkin Gulf.

1973 saw the development of the amphibious forces in the role of transporting third-country troops, first from Morocco to Syria, then Omani insurgents from Aden to near the Omani border area. The ambivalence about calling them proxy forces follows from the consideration that although they were clearly supporting Soviet general interests in a combat role, they were not proxies in the same sense as the Cuban troops later sent to Angola and Ethiopia.[15]

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[15]Jiri Valenta argues in [Ref. 15] that Castro's relationship with the MPLA was largely independent of Moscow's control until the imminent collapse of Neto's regime caused the Soviets to vastly increase the scale of their involvement and consequently take control of the operation. Thus it is an oversimplification to characterize the Cubans as "proxies" until the massive sea and airlift began and Soviet officers began directing the overall course of the conflict. See below for a more detailed discussion of the intervention.

The October War of 1973 startled many by the scale and speed of the Soviet naval buildup. It is as startling, though little noted, that the differences were largely of degree rather than kind, and that every aspect of the Soviet involvement had been "field exercised" in a previous crisis. The Latakia port visit after the war was a classic example of the Soviets using a proven method. As the mandate for the U.N. Golan Heights force was about to expire in November of 1974, and the Israelis were pointedly complaining about Soviet arms shipments to Syria, a combatant force carrying Vice Admiral Khovrin (then the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet) pulled into Latakia, the main terminus of Syrian resupply. It was a scaled-up repeat of the visits to Egyptian ports after the 1967 war.

The Angolan intervention exercised all the Third World intervention skills available to the Soviets, with the massive trooplift of Cuban forces and reported naval gunfire support (NGFS) of MPLA and Cuban combat operations representing new skills.[16] The use of Conakry, Guinea as a staging point not only for the airlift but for large scale open-ocean military reconnaissance reminds us, and them, of the value of the West Africa Patrol that was established above, originally to bolster a weak government. The Ethiopian operation drew heavily on this experience, using Aden in a way analagous to Conakry.

The Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979 was interesting because Soviet behavior was essentially similar to their support for North Vietnam against the United States, but tactically different in ways that reflect their different assessments of the threat. The eleven surface combatants dispatched to

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[16]These reports originated in the Angolan press and though possible, are unsubstantiated. They specifically suggest that a Kresta II cruiser fired its 57mm gun at FNLA positions in Lobito and Benguela, and that Soviet supplied (and manned) landing craft shelled Mocamedes.

the general area were better suited to command, surveillance and self defense than anti-carrier warfare.[17]

The transits of the Minsk and Novorossisk (follow-on units of the Kiev VTOL carrier) around Africa were significant events in that stops in Luanda, Angola with the Ivan Rogov (or her sister ship Nikolaev in the latter case) were each time included in the itinerary. Minsk, in her 1979 transit, engaged in exercise operations off the coast of South Africa, at a time when that country, the vanquished enemy in the Angolan war, was suffering an oil crisis. The Seychelles portvisits of the past couple of years have been meant to bolster the regime of President Rene, especially when he is out of the country for any reason. Having suffered several coup attempts, the presence of a cruiser or an amphibious ship with Soviet Naval Infantry aboard is considered a useful deterrent by the Seychellois government.

There are, clearly, several identifiable types of interventions that can be broken out in the ways that McGwire and McConnell did. The Middle East wars are obviously very different operationally and strategically from the various forays into Third World naval diplomacy, which themselves arise from several different sorts of situations. But as military operations, there are problems and limitations that characterize incidents more because of the physical realities of distance from base or enemy capabilities, for example, than the political or historical setting. And there are tactical lessons that carry over from one type of incident to another, in ways that are at least as instructive as any attempt to find geopolitical reasons for military events. The general trends in Soviet naval

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[17]The ships included a Kresta II ASW cruiser, a converted Sverdlov command and control ship, a Kashin, SAM Kotlin, a Krivak, and two Alligators. All of the above ships, except the LSTs, have SAMs for area or self defense, and no anti-ship cruise missiles are carried.

intervention and support overseas have included the follcwing:

1. U.S. naval forces precede Soviet forces to an area of ccntention.
2. The Soviets are willing to risk considerable danger of attack, especially from Israel, to show support for an ally in a crisis. These risks, however, are usually taken from a reactive rather than a belligerant posture, e.g. the stationing of ships in threatened ports.
3. Innovative tactics tend to appear in relatively low-risk situations, but once proven will be used consistently if possible.
4. The Soviets seem willing to take a significant portion of their regional major combatant crder of battle out of the home fleet area, if the U.S. forces that represent the primary threat are also deployed tc the same area.
5. The Soviets use the facilities they have acquired overseas to support operations that might help open up other facilities.

B. THE STAKES

Given this brief immersion in the details of the naval activity considered here, and the trends reflected over time, it is useful to return to the three type of ccst/risk and benefit. A seccnd look should provide a more concrete notion of what the Scviets might be considering when they decide whether to intervene, and how to manage an intervention cnce initiated.

1. The Ideological Stakes

The key variable in ideological risk was resolve--the commitment of the prestige of the Soviet state and the CPSU to a conflict. An interesting observation can be made in this regard simply by scanning the list of countries for which naval support has been demonstrated. The only country that could be considered a member of the Socialist Community in the sense of requiring full Soviet commitment is probably Vietnam. The point here is that if a member of the "Socialist Community" is in trouble, the commitment of the Soviet Union is automatic and irrevokable, at least in theory. This is a public fact, and the interesting logical corollary is that the U.S.S.R. must be careful whom it publicly acknowledges as deserving this distinction. Professor Jiri Valenta recently pointed out[18] that the Soviets, despite the massive military investment since December, 1979, have yet to refer to the Karmal government in Afghanistan as a member of the Socialist Community. The Sino-Vietnam case, of course, was a special one in which the PRC, a renegade member of the community, attacked another member. The ideological consequences of this were developed to the point of further attempting to undermine PRC influence in the communist movement, but not, of course, to the logical conclusion that the invasion defied the laws of scientific history.

When revolutionary goals and practices seem inconsistent, or logically impossible, or obscenely double-dealing (as in the case of the Eritrean rebels who found their former Cuban instructors working for the central government against them after 1977) the matter seems not to arise in the ideological realm.

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[18]In an address to a conference on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Monterey, California, 16 November, 1983.

The use of naval power in support of ideological goals, that is in being able to point to worldwide leadership of the revolution, seems to be growing in magnitude and sophistication. The Ghanain incident began with the seizure of Soviet fishing boats, but the seizure itself was justified by Ghana with the accusation that the Soviets were aiding pro-Nkrumah rebels. Certainly Soviet rhetoric supported them. Over the years, though, material aid to "revolutionary" parties has been selective and opportunistic. When opportunity coincides with strategic value and military capability, as it did in Angola, the support can be massive and the propaganda victory on the ideological level very considerable.

Ultimately, though, ideology is applied to the events that occur around the world from the position of power that the Soviets assume as the leaders of the Socialist world, that is, with complete freedom to interpret events and responses for the benefit of the rest of the "community." This is given attention, and surely a part of the planning that goes into a decision to intervene, but it seems unlikely that there could come an occasion when it was felt that a strategically necessary intervention must not take place on purely ideological grounds.

2. <u>The Economic Stakes</u>

Large investments have been made in the military support of Third World countries supported by the Soviet Union. To the extent possible these investments have been directly recouped in hard currency, but the limit of the likely capability of a country to find currency, or a willing sponsor with oil money, can be to a certain extent projected. The real money-making relationships have been, of course, with the oil-rich nations themselves, such as Libya and Iraq, where the market for arms might alone

justify military intervention, even if the oil itself was not directly available.

On another level, though, the strategic location or history of a country or region dictates that economic risk be incurred. The Middle East is clearly a special case in the strategic equations of the Soviets as well as the West. Large expenditures are considered worth the cost in Vietnam and Cuba, where the Soviets are almost certainly not making money, but where the level of access granted is offsetting.

The direct drain on the ledger sheet for overseas intervention would seem to be concentrated in the area of infrastructure for the direct support of Soviet forces rather than in the "aid" given to the indigenous military. In countries like Vietnam, Ethiopia, Aden, Somalia, and Egypt, among others, substantial resources have been put into basing facilities. In a few cases this investment was lost, but the temporary benefit was probably worth the cost, and the strategic advantage still to be had where the bases continue to exist is very great.

3. The Military Stakes

The military risks and benefits at stake in each of the incidents vary considerably, and can best be broken out by using tables as we did when considering the operational characteristics. Tables II and III list the incidents chronologically with a brief characterization of the risk or benefit involved in the same terms as previously considered. The subjective values "None", "Low," "Moderate," and "High" are given to the risks incurred by the Soviets in each category, with the likeliest adversary added in parentheses under the "risk to assets" column.

Such a table invites argument, of course, and where a value seems difficult to understand, please remember that it is the <u>risk</u> reasonably expectable to the Soviet planner

TABLE III
Military Risks

INCIDENT	WW III	ASSETS	GROUND	PRESTIGE
67 War	L-M	M(US,Is)	H	H
67 Hostage ships	L	M(Is)	M	H
68 Pueblo	M	M(US)	M	H
69 Ghana	N	N	N	L
69 EC-121	M	L(US)	M	M
69-70 Somalia	N	N	N	L
70 Jordan	M-H	L-M(US,Is)	M	M
70+ W. Africa	N	N	N	L
71 Indo-Pak	L	M(US)	L	M
72 Haiphong	M-L	M-L(US)	L	M
73 Moroccans	L	M-H(US,Is)	L	L
73 Aden lift	N	L(Oman,US)	L	M
73 October War	M-H	M-H(US,Is)	H	H
74 Latakia	L	H(Is)	M	H
75-6 Angola	L	M-L(US)	L	M-H
77-8 Ethiopia	L	L(US,Fr)	M	M
79 Sino-Viet	L	M(PRC)	H	H
79 Minsk	N	L(S.Af)	N	M
82-3 Seychelles	N	L(SOFs)	L	L
83 Novorossisk	N	N	N	L

that we are trying to understand. For example, in the course of the Jordanian crisis, the Soviets applied unprecedented tactics of generating functioning anti-carrier groups around each of the American carriers. This occurred during the course of the standoff, and since the carriers were

considered strategic strike assets by the Soviets, it seems reasonable that there was an elevation in the level of risk of nuclear war between the superpowers, if only war through inadvertance. That elevation is reflected in the "WW III" column. At the same time, the the risk from American ships to the Soviets is considered moderate because of the studiously non-aggessive stance maintained by the American naval forces throughout the crisis. In the Haiphong mining episode, the risk of war is seen as having lowered when the Echo-II submarine force stayed at anchor well away from the American ships involved in the operation. Similarly, the risk to Soviet assets from U.S. ships dropped during the Angolan intervention because the Congress made it clear that no direct involvement would be tolerated. After the paralyzing Tunney amendment passed, in mid-December, the Soviet sea and airlift dramatically increased in scope. Most importantly, though, the purpose of the chart is to illustrate general trends rather than to make points about specific interventions.

In Table III we invite a comparison of benefits gained in strategic ground and military prestige to the previously seen risks. Also listed is the specific military goal of the operation from the Soviet point of view and a rating of the combat training value in lieu of true "combat experience." In any case where new "ground" is broken, as in demonstrating a new combat technique, there is an inclination to give credit for at least "moderate" combat training value, which may be inflating the true value of, for example, anchoring the four Echo-IIs. It should also be noticed that the measurements of prestige and strategic ground to be gained benefit from hindsight, but represent the value of basing rights, etc., that the planner could reasonably have hoped for, and in most cases got. For example, though no basing rights are yet available in the

Seychelles, if the Soviets do manage to preserve the regime in a crisis it seems reasonable to expect that a loosening of restrictions might accrue, and air or naval basing rights here would be of high strategic and prestige value to the Soviets, especially since the buildup of Diego Garcia and the end of the "zone of peace" concept.

C. DECISION POINTS

In the introduction to this section, a series of general trends were isolated from the purely operational characteristics of the Soviet naval involvement in the incidents considered. The observations of the same incidents from the standpoint of risks taken and benefits expected tends to confirm the previously held list of trends and gives some perspective as to why the particular response was chosen by the Soviets. The trend over time has been to look for more low-risk, high-benefit situations, as one might expect. Where a commitment exists, however, as in the Middle East or Vietnam, a response to provocation from anyone will be made, even at considerable risk or in an unpredictable situation. There seems to be little evidence of Soviet escalation of the potential risk in a conflict once underway in order to make a greater benefit likely, although there is also little evidence of Soviet willingness to back down from an escalation initiated by the adversary force. On the contrary, the Soviets have in these cases applied very significant portions of their naval strength in order to continue to have the greatest possibile credibility. For example, during the Jordanian Crisis the Soviets deployed three of their five Black Sea Fleet cruise missile ships to form ACW groups around the U.S. battle groups. There is little reason to believe that much more than sixty percent of any ship type is likely to be available at a given time, so this

TABLE IV
Military Benefits

INCIDENT	GOAL/VALUE	GROUND	PRESTIGE
67 War	Surveill,Convoy/M	M	M
67 Hostage ships	Deter,solidarity/L	H	H
68 Pueblc	Surveillance/M	L	M
69 Ghana	Asset protect/L	M	M
69 EC-121	Surveill,Deter/M	M	M
69-70 Somalia	Suppt. regime/L	H	M
70 Jordan	ACW,Deter/H	M	H
70+ W. Africa	Presence/L	H	M
71 Indo-Pak	Preempt?/M	H	H
72 Haiphcng	Surveil,Deter/M	L	M
73 Moroccans	Asst Syria/M	M	H
73 Aden lift	Asst PAIGC/M	M	M
73 October War	Surv,ACW,Convoy/H	H	H
74 Latakia	Deter Israel/L	H	H
75-6 Angcla	Estab. regime/H	H	H
77-8 Ethiopia	Suppt. regime/H	H	H
79 Sino-Vietnam	Suppt. client/H	H	H
79 Minsk transit	Impress natives/L	L	M
82-3 Seychelles	Suppt. regime/L	H	H

was probably the entire ready order of battle.[19] On the other hand, there is evidence that the Soviets make every attempt to keep their involvement non-military as long as

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[19]For a description of the disposition of the ships see Stephen Roberts in [Ref. 9: p. 173]. This analysis, however, is my own.

possible. Even when the stakes are high, the use or threat of force is withheld until it seems necessary. Where the military risk is very slight, the Soviets are prone to keep their military commitment proportionally small, even when the potential gain is great, as in Angola.

A new set of general trends can be formulated, based upon the operational observations, and speaking to the cost-benefit calculations made in the course of a conflict:

1. Recognize strategic necessities and make the enemy know what they are.
2. Create situations only when they can be predictably managed to their conclusion.
3. Maintain control of your economic and especially your military assets.
4. Extend commitments in the following order:
   a) Ideological/political.
   b) Economic.
   c) Military.
5. Back up commitments at the appropriate level (ideological, economic, or military) and be consistent.
6. Make military commitments credible by making them proportional.
   a) Identify and threaten the <u>real</u> enemy with the appropriate type and level of force.
   b) Communicate a willingness to use the weapon.

Before proceeding to the case studies, an important reminder is in order. As we mentioned earlier, this study is concerned primarily with Soviet intervention beyond those areas that could be considered part of the strategic buffer zone around Soviet borders. Operationally that was defined as the area covered by Soviet tactical aircraft operating from the homeland. This definition, though, makes the status of Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and the Korean peninsula ambiguous, when in fact there is abundant reason

to consider them "strategic" to the Soviet Union. An obvious and appropriate point to raise is that the increased range of sea-based weapons in the 1950s and 1960s made the Eastern Mediterranean and the Sea of Japan possible launch points for nuclear-armed carrier aircraft and, later, submarine launched missiles. Most of the cases of Soviet naval force projection have been in these areas, though, and so we must be careful about extrapolating lessons learned in one regime to another. This analysis states that with attention to the contenders, the stakes, and the assets employed by both sides, this can be reasonably done.

D. CASE STUDIES OF DECISION POINTS

In order to review a variety of the most important cases, we will consider the June War, the Jordanian Crisis, the Angolan intervention, and the Sino-Vietnam conflict. As a curiosity, the unusual deployments during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 will be briefly reviewed for evidence that it was a failed attempt at U.S.-style pre-emptive deployment.

1. The June War of 1967

Soviet interest in the Middle East is historical, but the Soviet decisions leading up to their involvement in the naval maneuvers during the war are identifiable. Their commitments were in the order presented in our general trends: they offered political encouragement to the Arab socialist regimes in Egypt and Baathist Syria, and followed up with economic support and military aid. When Palestinian commandos used Syria as a base for attacking Israel, the Soviets decided to offer ideological support only. The first crisis decision points of the 1967 war came on 19 and 22 May when the Egyptians evicted the UN peacekeeping forces

from the Sinai and blockaded the Strait of Tiran, which commands Israel's only access to the Red Sea. This latter action, of course, is an act of war, and it violates the right of free passage of international waters that the Soviets have long supported. The Soviets kept a low profile on the matter and expressed no interest in joining in any attempt to reopen the strait against Egyptian will. The effect of the Soviet response was to demilitarize the Egyptian act of war by simply ignoring it. The West was oddly cooperative in letting the issue lie until the war settled it (among other things).

At this time, the American carriers Saratoga and America were in the Eastern Mediterranean engaged in normal exercises. A decision was made to put them under surveillance by Soviet destroyers. This had the effect of providing accurate data to Moscow as to the position and activity of the carriers without presenting a serious threat. Significantly, two cruise missile destroyers were sent to the Mediterranean in the first week of June, just before the war, to augment the tattletale force. The ships were a Kilden and a Krupnyy equipped with the already obsolete SS-N-1 system. One "Kynda" class cruiser was in the Black Sea order of battle, carrying eight SS-N-3 long range missiles and reloads, but it was not brought down.

Soon after the war began on 5 June it was clear that it would be a disaster for Egypt and Syria. The Soviet support of her allies consisted of resupply, with a large number of ships and aircraft bringing military replacement stock. But this was essentially economic and moral support, the Soviet Navy's protection of Soviet ships from Israeli attack was not so much combat support of Syria as it was a defense of the right of free passage.

When on 10 June Syria's Golan defenses collapsed, Israel threatened to march to Damascus, at which point the

strategic interests (ideological, economic, and military) of the Soviet Union were directly jeopardized. Kosygin threatened direct intervention, but it was airborne units that would have been used, not naval forces.[20] And the U.S. carriers both sailed to the Levantine coast, disregarding the cruise missile threat from the Soviet destroyers.

What was learned? The value of the tattletales was probably the most important discovery. But the cruise missile threat to the carriers was not credible and had no effect on their movement to the war zone when they chose to. Thus the threat to the United States, the real enemy, was not proportional. Even the airborne threat was a suicide mission to raise the stakes to a U.S./U.S.S.R. confrontation that neither wanted. Only the direct risk of losing Syria to the West made such a risk conceivable. So a credible naval threat did not exist for lack of assets and tactics, forcing a confrontation to a higher, less cost-effective plane. And worse, the situation put Israel in the position of determining whether the strategic confrontation would be necessary.

2. The Jordanian Crisis of 1971

Four years later, the Soviets used a roughly similar circumstance to demonstrate that they now had the capability to credibly participate in a crisis at the conventional level, at least to the point where it was they who determined that it should escalate.

In 1970 the Palestinians were using Jordan as a staging base for attacks against Israel. The Soviet Union continued its relationship with Syria and Egypt, although Egypt had by now split with Syria on the matter of the "Rogers Plan," which gave Jordan control of the West Bank to

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[20]Anthony B. Wells, "The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War," in [Ref. 9: p. 166].

administer the Palestinians. The Palestinians expressed little regard for Hussein's rule, and were ordered expelled on 15 September. Over the next five days Jordanian and Syrian Army forces clashed until the Syrians actually invaded with a column of tanks that were pushed back three days later.

The Soviets were close to Syria politically, but ambivalent because Nasser was the key to their Middle East diplomacy. The United States interest was in the large number of U.S. citizens in Jordan.

American response was swift. Airborne units were alerted in the United States and in Europe. The carriers Independence and Saratoga were in the Eastern Mediterranean and the John F. Kennedy was sent from the United States.

Soviet response was, this time, proportional and credible. A Kynda cruiser, two SSM Destroyers, at least one "Juliett" class missile submarine and several other submarines were present to constitute a genuine anti-carrier capability, especially when the Black Sea Naval Air Force bombers in the Crimea are figured into the equation. The Juliett actually remained surfaced, with two Foxtrot submarines, for a week during the crisis in order, one assumes, to make her presence known. The case was made that the United States did not have complete freedom of action in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, it was for the first time established that the Soviet Union could exercise some control over the escalation of the conflict. It was no longer true that a third party such as Israel could put them in a purely reactive or defensive position.

The decision point came when the augmentation of the naval force was clearly for the purpose of anti-carrier warfare. Furthermore, the anti-carrier posturing went on until the U.S. forces left the Eastern Mediterranean, in late October, one month after the original crisis had

passed. The strategic necessity was not so much the westernization of Jordan, or the growth of U.S. diplomatic influence, or even the survival of the Palestinians. It was to make the point that the Eastern Mediterranean was not an American lake. And a confrontation that can be considered a standoff with the United States Navy is a net gain for Soviet prestige, as has been pointed out before.

3. The 1975-76 Angolan Intervention

In the strategic equation, Angola was little to "lose" for the Soviet Union and a great deal to gain. No question of strategic strike advantages for the United States existed (as in any case involving the Eastern Med) and the third party to the conflict, Cuba, was controlled from Moscow when the combat reached a high level of intensity.

In October of 1975, 1500 Cubans were training and advising fighters for the MPLA, which was contending with the Zaire-backed FNLA and the South Africa-backed UNITA for control of the former Portuguese colony. On the 23rd, South African regulars invaded from the South. An airlift by Soviet military transport aircraft began, bringing military supplies, but by mid-November the Cubans and the MPLA were being pushed back toward Luanda on two fronts by the other groups. Cuban ships and aircraft had begun reinforcing their troops and 17C Soviet advisors were in country by 13 November.

In late November Zaire operated three Swift boats off North Angola and Cabinda, which it's FNLA group had invaded. This was within 20 miles of the port of Pointe Noir, where Soviet arms shipments were made and where several Soviet merchant ships were then docked. An Alligator LST was dispatched from Conakry, Guinea (the West Africa Patrol) as the appropriate response to the danger.

Onboard was an SNI detatchment with antitank rockets and SA-9 antiaircraft missiles visible on deck. Defense of Soviet civilians and evacuation seemed possible. As the course of the war continued to turn against the Cubans and the FNLA, a SAM Kotlin destroyer began to transit from the Eastern Mediterranean.

On 19 December the Tunney Amendment passed the Senate, and although the House didn't vote for another month, it seemed unlikely that the U.S. would intervene.[21] The Ford administration turned its attention to disrupting the airlift by convincing first Barbados then the Azores to refuse the Cubans landing rights. The Soviets sent long-range Il-62 transports to continue the Cuban reinforcement via Conakry, as a Kresta II ASW cruiser left the Mediterranean and transited to the Conakry area, perhaps to provide navigation or other assistance to the airlift.

As the carrier Saratoga prepared to leave Mayport, Florida for its scheduled Mediterranean cruise, the U.S. was publicly complaining about Soviet naval presence in the Angolan area. The Soviets had moved most of their ships to the Conakry area, and were preparing a large-scale surveillance effort across the Central Atlantic (to track U.S. deployments) including Bear-D aircraft from Havana and Conakry, an intelligence collection ship (AGI Vertikal) to the mid-Atlantic along the great circle route from Florida or Cuba to Angola, and a contingency ACW group in the Western Mediterranean in case the Saratoga was detected enroute to Angolan waters. The ACW group, consisting of a Kresta I, a Mod Kashin, and a Juliett SSG never formed up

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[21]For a discussion of the American politics involved see William E. Griffith's article "Soviet Power and Policies in the Third World: the Case of Africa" in [Ref. 16].

because the Saratoga deployed normally, to the Mediterranean.[22]

In the Angolan case, the commitments were clearly made in the correct order, and always at the appropriate level of response. The military commitment was consistent and proportional, the ACW group described above being of text book composition, and especially credible in hindsight because the Juliett was discovered as it surfaced in Conakry after the crisis wound down, after the Saratoga was in the Mediterranean. The crisis was very well managed in the sense that large assets were brought in, especially the airlift, in relatively short order, and adaptations were made when the landing rights problem arose. The crisis, and the Soviet assets, and the Soviet interest, were controlled from Moscow with skill and restraint.

4. The Sino-Vietnamese War

This conflict, between two communist states, is raised again to reinforce a point made earlier. Soviet commitments to Vietnam had long been ideological, material, and military. The military commitment, though, was against the United States, and it operated within set boundaries. When the adversary became the PRC, there was little inclination to go beyond the level of response previously exercised against the U.S. The emphasis was on "escalation dominance" to use Alexander George's term.[23] With the Pacific Fleet a far more credible threat to the PRC than it was to the United States, in fact a clearly superior force, the

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[22]Valenta, in [Ref. 17], describes the broad range of Soviet maritime involvement, including the alleged intimidation of the Saratoga group.

[23]George describes the needs of the superpowers (specifically the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., although the concept applies here) to have a visible means of maintaining the upper hand in a series of forseeable escalations of a conflict to feel secure. See [Ref. 18].

cpportunity existed to exercise controlled restraint. The Soviets cculd threaten a relatively significant level of force against the PRC with several higher conventional levels tc climb to if necessary. This is U.S.-style naval diplcmacy, and it requires good command and control in crder to wcrk. AGIs were used for intelligence collection and command and control ships were prepared to direct any military action that might be deemed necessary: to defend the convoys of supplies or the Vietnamese ports themselves. Regular Bear-D recornaissance also helped the Soviets keep the situation porpcrtional and predictable and under control.

5. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, A Non-Case

A case that stands out among the others for the unusual operational characteristics of the Soviet deplcyments is the response to the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. Because it is unique in several ways, I have separated it from the chronological order of the other case studies so that the qualities that distinguish it are more easily seen.

The war began as a conflict between Bengali naticnalists and the Pakistani government. In March of that year the Pakistani government cracked down and massive numbers of refugees began to enter India. India supported the Bengali guerillas that were fighting the Pakistani government and on 3 December, Pakistani aircraft bombed targets in India as a retaliatcry gesture. Indian troops then advanced and tcok Dacca on 16 December.

At the time cf the Pakistani airstrike, the British Navy had a two-carrier force in the Indian ocean (the attack carrier Eagle and the commandc carrier Albion, plus about nine other combatant ships). Soviet and American force levels were normal, and roughly equal. The Soviets had a deisel attack submarine, a destroyer, an Alligator tank

landing ship, and a minesweeper. The U.S. force was the standard Persian Gulf force of two gun-destroyers and a command ship.[24]

About three days after the Pakistani strike, a Soviet ACW group including a Kynda, a Juliett missile sub, and a Foxtrot submarine were dispatched from Vladivostok. At the time, only the British carriers were in the Indian Ocean to shoot at, and so McConnell and Calhoun conclude that the group was directed at them. A few days later, on 10 December, the U.S. carrier Enterprise left Yankee station in the Gulf of Tonkin to form up TF-74 and steam to the Bay of Bengal, actually preceding the Soviet ACW group through the Malacca Strait. On the 12th or 13th, a second full-fledged ACW group steamed from the Pacific Fleet area, this time consisting of a Kresta I missile cruiser, an Echo-II missile sub, and a Kashin destroyer. McConnell concludes that this group was sent in response to TF-74.

If indeed these deployments were correlated to events, in each case the response of forming an operational ACW group took only about three days, and together the Kynda and Kresta-I comprised two-thirds of all the missile cruisers in the Pacific fleet. In all, a spectacular achievement, especially considering that the ACW group concept had been pioneered only the year before, in another fleet.

As an alternate explanation that seems to be more in line with operational reality, it will be suggested here that the Indo-Soviet relationship was close enough[25] to

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[24]The description of the facts of this conflict is taken at face value from McConnell and Calhoun in [Ref. 9: pp. 178-192.]. See also an earlier version in [Ref. 19: pp. 442-455]. The analysis offered here differs considerably from theirs, as will be apparent.

[25]A friendship treaty was signed during the Summer preceeding the war, and just before the war an Indo-Soviet pact "nullifying the Chinese threat" was completed [Ref. 19: p. 186].

permit the Soviets tc be infcrmed of Indian plans for war, which were made well in advance. If one assumes that the Soviets intended to form ACW groups and deploy them pre-emptively as a shcw of support for India against the impending and mutually feared Sino-American axis, then why did TF-74 get there first? Because Pakistan surprised everycne by initiating hostilities even while hopelessly outgunned and outmanned. Once the air strikes had taken place, the war was underway and the Soviets had to send their ACW groups along a bit sooner than expected, but not as sccn as a deployed and combat-ready TF-74 could steam into the Indian Ocean. Why two ACW groups? Because the British were already there, and Enterprise was the logical U.S. resecnse. So the Soviets extended their commitments in the lcgical order, made plans for a proportional military backup tc a crisis they knew would occur, and expected a very cost-effective demonstration of Soviet naval power and commitment for an important new ally. The only factor they did not have advance knowledge cf or control over was the seemingly irrational Pakistani air strike against India. And sc, despite the best-laid plans, the attempt at a pre-emptive ACW deployment failed, although the rest of the scenario went off as it might have been expected to, with Soviet-American naval interaction continuing for about two weeks. It did not begin, of course, until five days after the Pakistari surrender.

There is no direct evidence to support the collusion thesis presented here; it is based entirely upon the unlikelihood of such rapid Soviet naval response and the incentives for both the Soviet Union and India to share such rather expectable plans (ie. the plans for Indian aggression against Pakistan).

VI. INTENTIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND INTERVENTIONS

The conclusion that has arisen from the data so far is that there are indeed patterns to be found in Soviet interventionary behavior. At the purely operational level, it was seen that the Soviets were invariably preceeded by the U.S. Navy into areas of mutual interest. This, as the Indo-Pakistan war suggests, is not because the Soviets have a policy of reaction that is rigidly enforced. Rather, a scarcity of anti-carrier warfare assets makes it virtually impossible to be sure of an appropriate level of response, and escalation dominance, unless a considerable period of pre-knowledge of the crisis is available to generate ACW formations. Given a commitment, though, the Soviets seem willing to risk considerable danger of attack in order to consistently support their own freedom to materially reinforce and trade freely with their allies. That is, they will enter relatively unpredictable situations with a high possibility of attack from Israel or the PRC to guarantee resupply of their clients. There seems also to be a reluctance to try out new tactics in a situation that carries high risk or cannot be pre-planned to its conclusion. When pre-planning is done, there seems to be little reluctance to commit a very high proportion of the available ACW assets to a conflict, as long as the U.S. carriers are also likely to appear. Finally, operations indicate that the Soviets use overseas facilities very aggressively in order to extend the range of their combat ships and especially to operate ocean surveillance aircraft when a crisis can be forseen or controlled from the beginning.

The operational data, then, suggest more than anything else that the Soviet navy is likely to project itself with

an intensity that is in direct proportion to the degree that rational pre-planning can be expected to accurately predict events. There are few signs of initiative, and when new tactics appear they seem to have been pre-planned and applied to the first appropriate incident to arise. The most innovative tactics have, interestingly, appeared in the Pacific Fleet, which might be showing evidence of enjcying it's remcteness from the General Staff.[26]

Ultimately, a set of principles was derived that seems to express the cost-benefit calculations at any point in the escalatien of a crisis. Although the seven principles cffered have some of the same mushiness that prompted our final criticisms of McConnell, each does have explicit significance for Soviet decisions about use of their fcrces in a crisis. For example, the order in which commitments should be made is easy to follow, and most of the interpretive fine points about where "economic" military aid ends and direct "military" aid begins seem to have been worked cut over time. This is enough to make the choice cf an "appropriate" response to a crisis fairly automatic, and "consistency" an appeal to intellectual conservatism, which would be well-received in the Soviet Union. "Proportional" backing for commitments becomes relatively straightforward when the actual decisicn point is a consideration of whether to send ACW forces or amphibious forces, for example, and is driven by an identificatien of who represents the real adversary. The final four principles for decision making in a crisis are very simple rules of management that might arise frcm any "scientific" study of game theory or operations analysis.

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[26]The examples intended here include pioneering air and submarine dominated ACW tactics and the Indo-Pakistan deployment. These all took place from 1969 to 1971, however, so the new management since might be suffering the rapidly improving command and control system's responsiveness.

Tc the extent that the limitations under which the Soviets feel that they operate are known, then, we can expect tc be able to make fairly accurate projections of the operaticnal decisions they are likely to make in a naval power or influence projection scenario that arises beyond Soviet hcme waters. This also creates a baseline, departures from which deserve special attention from U.S. planners.

The critical variables to be considered in making these projections ultimately revolve around the capability of the Soviet Union to act. This capability is defined by ideological, econcmic, and military constraints, of course, but two impcrtant points must be made before this analysis proceeds:

1. Capabilities drive intentions, and
2. Military capabilities best define the limits of intervention.

There is a schocl of thought which holds that foreign policy intentions precede the development of the capabilities to carry them out. Certainly there could be no more rational way of carrying out the international functions of government, and there is nc argument in this analysis with the notion that the Soviet government represents an expressly rational philosophy. But in the real world of military capabilities and intentions to carry out policy, there is little doubt that only the most general intenticns can be served by weapcns systems which take something on the order of a decade tc develop and produce in significant numbers. And the history of third world interventicns developed so far indicates that when military requirements arise far from home, there is little warning and the specific military tools best suited to the problem can vary widely. The suggestion that military assets are wedded to the intentions that prompted their original design seems

unrealistic. More to the point, though, this analysis rejects the suggestion that policy makers are limited in their use of weapons to the tasks for which they were originally designed. That is, there is no intention here to argue that the ships and naval infantry forces discussed in the next chapters are specifically tasked with carrying out interventions in "local wars," or overseas interventions, or even that they were designed with either as a secondary function. Although most large naval ships are designed with some flexibility of function, and I tend to believe that the mission was indeed considered in the new designs, the point is irrelevant to this analysis. It will only be contended here that should the intention to so use such forces for local intervention arise in the future, even if for the first time, it is assured that the standing capability to act at that time will determine the likelihood and scope of any intervention that is proposed or carried out. If the usefulness of Soviet naval assets for intervention can be defined, then we have a parameter setting the outside "limits of intervention." Whatever intention develops, even if none exists today, is constrained by the military materiel limits <u>at the time intervention decisions are made</u>. The reverse is not true.

One of the better arguments for the view that naval shipbuilding programs (i.e. capabilities) predict naval missions (or intentions) is presented by Keith A. Dunn:

> "If the USSR intended to alter its current naval posture so as to handle these 'gray area' missions (the ability to oppose naval intervention, participate in a prolonged theater conflict, engage in an extended 'war at sea,' or fight an all-out conventional war) and to move away from a sea denial role toward a sea control mission, analysts would observe new trends in the rates of ship construction. Since navies are expensive and require long lead-time constructions, one would expect to see some major changes in the pattern of Soviet naval building. However, no such changes are now apparent. Soviet ship designers and builders still tend to concentrate their efforts in two traditional 'non-force projection' areas, those of nuclear submarines and antisubmarine warfare." [Ref. 20: p. 251]

Earlier in the same volume, though, Donald Daniel's article on the Soviet navy describes precisely the building programs that in this analysis represent a move to non-traditional "force projection" capabilities for the 1980s and beyond.[27]

Capabilities, of course, are more than just a measure of weapons. The ideological and economic components of the decision to act have been developed here and found to be important elements. But they are also the more volitile variables in the equation. Ideological standards can change dramatically in the Soviet Union, in an address by the General Secretary or by a succession in leadership as examples. However predictable general economic trends in the managed Soviet economy may be (and this is open to argument), the decisions of the Politboro as to how they will actually allocated and where an intervention might rank in Soviet funding priorities are unpredictable. Shipbuilding programs, though, project several years ahead of their detection a general idea of what the Soviet oceanic forces will consist of. Programs can be cancelled or cut back, and merchant ships can be purchased from other countries (as they often are by the Soviets), but a good sense of the lineup of ships is available for analysis.

The next two chapters will attempt to develop operational definitions of the actual capabilities of Soviet naval interventionary forces. Assuming that at some point during the 1980s the ideological, economic, and military factors describing a third world situation lead to a decision to intervene, the maximum level of interventionary capability should be available from careful operational definitions of the Soviet forces available for the task.

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[27][Ref. 20: pp. 136-137]. Among the new programs Daniel mentions are the fourth "Kiev" class, the new large CTOL carrier, the "Kirov," "Black-com," "Udaloy," and "Sovremennyy" classes, which are described in detail and in context below.

First there will be an objective description of the physical military assets available for use in a local war. In the course of this discussion the overriding requirements for homeland defense will be considered to develop a sense of the ability of the Soviets to commit forces credibly through the levels of escalation that might be required by the analysis so far. Chapter eight will be concerned with an aggregation of the objective ships and aircraft and vehicles and men into a set of measurements of Soviet capabilities to carry out actual interventions at three logical levels of force employment.

VII. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS--THE ASSETS

The naval assets necessary to the Soviet Union for power projection to "local wars" as defined above fall into four main categories:

1. The surface combatants.
2. The amphibious ships.
3. Naval auxiliaries and merchant ships, and
4. Soviet Naval Infantry troops and equipment.

A. THE SURFACE COMBATANTS

The surface ship building programs in the Soviet Union have been subject to a tremendous volume of analysis on various levels, but our intention here is rather modest.[28] We will examine a snapshot of the Soviet Navy as it exists in the Fall of 1983 with an eye to what these ships have to offer to the Eskadra commander tasked with supporting an intervention far from home. That is, traditional measures such as displacement tonnage are not as important as the type and amount of ordnance that can be applied, in a timely way, to the target that has been defined. Endurance, for which displacement is a pretty good indirect measure, is considered important, but at a certain point it is the support forces that define the limitations in this area as well as so many others, so when any measure of expendables, including ammunition, is attempted it is imperative that the supply lines be considered. We will begin with narrative descriptions of some of the larger ships, concentrating on

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[28]A comprehensive analysis of Soviet ships and naval weapons keyed to production decisions through 1969 appears in McGwire's article "The Structure of the Soviet Navy" in [Ref. 19: pp. 151-162].

the specific capabilities that seem most applicable tc the requirements for distant interventions.

The "Kiev" class VTOL carrier is the largest combatant ship ever built in the Soviet Union, at about 43,000 tons. At the time of her appearance in 1976 there was a flurry of public speculation about the likely missions for which she might have been designed. As a unique departure for the Soviets intc fixed-wing avaition at sea,[29] consideration was given tc the obvious possibility that she was designed to carry out the same missions that western carriers do. But the ship is dramatically different from the large carriers in the U.S. fleet, in that it has such limited aviation capability and such traditional Soviet cruiser armament as the lcng-range SS-N-12 anti-ship cruise missile and two complementary surface-to-air missile systems, the medium range SA-N-3 and the short-range SA-N-4. It is also armed with anti-submarine rcckets, torpedoes, 76mm guns, and a series of anti-missile gatling guns. None of these things, with the exception of a similar gatling gun system that has been recently added, are found on U.S. aircraft carriers. Their functions are carried out by the combined firepower of the embarked airwing and the other ships in the battlegroup. The Soviets, then, essentially put a small battlegroup worth of capability aboard each of these ships, either because the airwing was going tc consist of a dozen rather unsophisticated airplanes, or because the battlegroup was not going to exist in the sense that it does in western fleets, or both. But this assumes that the Soviet intention was to use the ships for the same purposes that a battlegroup is designed, and the more sophisticated analysts realized that there was no reascn tc believe that this was so.

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[29]The Forger, discussed below, is the only fixed-wing (as opposed to rotary-wing, or helicopter) aircraft carried by the Kiev ships.

A currently popular choice for the mission of the Kiev ships (there are three hulls currently active, with the fourth fitting out) is the protection of Soviet ballistic missile firing submarines in wartime.[30] The missile armament seems appropriate to the task, certainly, as a significant part of the threat to the SSBNs resides in the land and sea-based anti-submarine aircraft and the ASW capabilities of the carrier and her escort ships. Defeating American submarines, which are perhaps the greatest single threat to the Soviet subs, involves using the on-board torpedo and depth-bomb weapons, probably as a last ditch self-defense measure, and the cocrdinated ASW capabilities of a surface task group and a large number of attack submarines. Large anti-submarine ships were being built at this time, as we will see below, as were the needed attack submarines. To make this plan work, Kiev had to have a very sophisticated command-a d-control system, and one was installed. So the SSBN prctection mission seems well considered, but not related to the problem of intervention.

Nevertheless the capabilities built in, for whatever reason, are applicable to the intervention mission if the cverriding requirement for SSBN security can be met in scme cther way, or if the threat is considered low enough to permit the ships to be otherwise engaged. Specifically, the weapcns designed to be used against an American threat to the submarine bastions are equally effective against U.S. ships and submarines headed for the site of a planned Soviet intervention. Looking ashore, the cruise missiles and even the SAMs cculd provide spectacular and intimidating (if innacurate and expensive) bombardment weapons in their secondary modes of operation. The 76mm guns (about 3-inch) have fairly short range and little penetrating power against

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[30]See Jchn G. Habbits' first chapter in [Ref. 21: pp. 12-13].

a fortified coastline, but with explosive shells and proximity or VT fuzing, could be very effective against personnel and light defenses.

The Forger is so inadequate a design that no one seems to consider it odd for the only fixed-wing aircraft or the only fixed-wing "ASW" carrier to have no particular capabilities against submarines. This may be because it has no discernable strengths either.

Forger suffers some dreadful design deficiencies relative even to the British Harrier, which also emerged from early 1960s technology. The primary difference is the Soviet failure, even to this day, to build a high-bypass turbofan engine. The Harrier flies with a single Pegasus engine of this type while the Forger uses three smaller, less efficient engines, two of which are vertically installed lift-only engines that must be turned off in horizontal flight. The inefficiency of hauling two unused jet engines around is obvious and it results in severe restrictions on range and payload. An obvious mission given these restrictions is as a fighter in the immediate vicinity of the ship, and the aircraft does indeed carry infrared guided air-to-air missiles[31] (there is no fire control radar aboard, so radar guided missiles cannot be used). This extends the air defense range of the ship beyond the SA-N-3 range, but not as much as one might hope, and the Forger cannot fight an air-to-air battle with a true tactical fighter in any case. The reason for this is that the British Harrier, which was quite successful in tactical engagements against the Argentines, uses the vectorable engine nozzles in flight to achieve maneuvers that no conventional aircraft can match. The Forger design almost

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[31] A photograph of a Forger carrying what appears to be an AA-8 missile under the port wing appears in [Ref. 22: p. 54].

certainly does not permit the pilot to control his thrust direction relative to the airframe for tactical purposes.

Of what use, then, is an airplane that can deliver only two weapons of any size over a short distance? If those two weapons are anti-radiation missiles, and the anti-air threat is from surface-to-air missiles near the beach rather than from tactical fighters, then a limited capability to carry out what the U.S. Navy calls the IRON HAND mission, or SAM suppression, exists. And a Forger with air-to-air missiles is perfectly capable of shooting down large, unmaneuverable aircraft such as transports and larger bombers. The capability to intimidate all but tactical military air traffic is not inconsiderable.

Among the large combatant ships that were built at roughly the same time as Kiev are the "Kara" and "Kresta II" class ASW cruisers. These ships are nearly identical in weapons and electronics, the primary difference being in their propulsion systems; the Kresta II has a conventional steam plant, indeed a recycled hull design, while the Kara was a new hull with gas-turbine power.[32] Kara was, until the American Spruance ships appeared, in a class by herself as the largest gas turbine ship in the world. The weapons aboard these ships include the SS-N-14 anti-submarine missile, torpedoes, SA-N-3 SAMS, and either 57mm (on Kresta IIs) or 76mm guns. The Kara also has the SA-N-4 point defense missile. The value of these ships to the task of protecting the SSBN bastions in concert with the Kiev has already been discussed. It is interesting to compare, as we

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[32]This is an interesting example of one important element in the conservatism of Soviet design practices. Although they had proven the value of gas-turbine power in large ships by pioneering the concept with the "Kashin" class destroyers, at the time it was decided to build cruisers with the Kara/Kresta II weapons suite, the notion was sufficiently radical, and the mission sufficiently important, to require that a proven hull and power plant be under construction at the same time as the new Kara configuration.

do in Table V, the considerable overlap in the capabilities of these ships when compared to the Kiev. When the common weapons systems are subtracted out, we see the true value of the Kiev in a Kiev/Kara/Kresta II battle group, and what would be required to replace her in that function. Clearly, the common systems are mostly self-protection systems, which makes sense in a dispersed wartime formation when mutual air defense is most difficult. The interesting result of the subtraction is to note that the contribution of the Kiev to the protection of the SSBN bastions lies in the Forger (which can perform manned reconaissance and perhaps shoot P-3 Orion anti-submarine aircraft flying out of Iceland), in the SS-N-12 anti-ship missile, and perhaps in the command and control suite. For those who insist that the Kiev is essential to this mission of bastion protection,
we will offer below a list of new ships that seem entirely capable of carrying out these same missions.

TABLE V

Kiev In a Cruiser Task Force

Kiev	Kara	Kresta II	Kiev unique
SA-N-3	SA-N-3	SA-N-3	No
SA-N-4	SA-N-4	No	No
76mm	76mm	57mm	No
Gat	Gat	Gat	No
Helos	Helo	Helo	No
Sonar	Sonar	Sonar	NO
ASW Rocket	SS-N-14	SS-N-14	Kiev lacks
SS-N-12	No	No	Yes
Forger	No	No	Yes
Cmd&Ctl	Probably	Less	Maybe

Before we proceed, though, a few moments should be spent on the two "Moskva" class helicopter cruisers, which appeared in 1968 and 1969. They were extremely innovative designs that anticipated most of the new aspects of the Kiev, but they have been judged as failures by many and have certainly not seen a great deal of open ocean use by the Soviets. Moskva and her sistership Leningrad were probably designed to serve the anti-SSBN function in the Norweigian Sea and Eastern Mediterranean but became obsolete in that role when longer-range U.S. SLBMs permitted more remote American submarine deployments [Ref. 23: p. 130]. Moskva was the first ship to carry the SA-N-3 SAM, and it also has 57mm guns and ASW weapons. Her air arm is all helicopters. The obvious differences from Kiev, then, are an inferior self-defense capability, the lack of the Forger, and the absence of the long-range anti-ship missile. There may also be a seaworthiness problem that would have contributed to the abandonment of the design [Ref. 24: p. 510].

At the same time that the anti-submarine combatant designs were getting all the new construction money, a smaller but still considerable force of anti-shipping cruisers existed, having been built in the 1960s. The "Kynda" and "Kresta I" classes were designed around the SS-N-3 long-range cruise missile, and four were built of each class. Kynda carries eight ready cruise missiles and eight reloads, which is a tremendous amount of firepower due to the large size of the missiles. She has only one launcher for the short-range, obsolete, SA-N-1 SAM. Kresta I mounts four SS-N-3 cruise missiles and two SA-N-1 launchers. This pair of designs thus illustrates an element in the Soviet theory of self-defense at sea that applies across the board: the best defense is a good offense. That is, an inferior SAM system can be to a degree compensated for if there is a 250 nautical mile circle around the ship

within which a hostile unit (carrier or cruise missile shooter) is in mortal danger. If the hostile aircraft carrier is to stay outside this ring, threatening carrier-borne tactical bombers are guaranteed to be at or near maximum range, where their time on station is severely restricted. In such a situation, more aircraft are needed to achieve continuous coverage, and for practical purposes, with more than one missile ship, a limit is soon reached. Beside this so-called "force multiplier" effect is the simple reality that in order to maintain surveillance and conserve fuel at the ragged edge of a jet aircraft's range, it must fly high and slow, thus making it a much simpler fire control problem for the SAM, and a target that can be hit by a less sophisticated system. So a relatively smaller number of these ships was needed as compared to the ASW ships, and less sophisticated air defense weaponry was required.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a whole new generation of ships that fits into this large destroyer and cruiser size category has begun to emerge from the Soviet shipyards. They are, to a more striking degree than ever, divisible into anti-submarine oriented ships and cruise missile strike ships. Each is equipped with a new technology surface to air missile suite and, interestingly, with new gun systems that feature relatively large bore weapons with a high rate of fire.

The most spectacular of the new units is the large nuclear-powered strike cruiser Kirov, which displaces about 28,000 tons full load. She is the largest non-carrier combatant built by any navy since the second World War. The second of the series is now fitting out. In addition to a complete command and control suite, Kirov is fitted with the most advanced missile systems and a sophisticated ASW capability. Her air defense centers around the long-range

SA-N-6 SAM, to which the closest American analog is the Patrict missile. This may be the most sophisticated SAM at sea anywhere. For close-in air defense the short range SA-N-4 and the multiple gatling guns are installed. The long range cruise missile is the new SS-N-19, whose range at least matches the 250+ nautical miles of the Kiev's SS-N-12. There are, presumably, other improvements as well in this system, but the most readily apparent boost in capability is the presence of 20 missiles, in well-shielded launching positions, ready to fire at any given moment. Kiev had eight missiles ready to fire in vulnerable above-deck launchers, and reloads that would have to be hoisted one at a time into position using a cumbersome crane and elevator system. The ASW armament of the ship includes the SS-N-14 missile, which is the Soviet's front line anti-submarine weapon, a variable-depth trailing sonar, and several ASW helicopters of the new Helix type. This ship is, in every measure that applies to the submarine bastion support mission, superior to the Kiev ships. The only "deficiency" is the absence of Forger aircraft, which, in this role, have only a limited air defense function that is more than compensated for by the SA-N-6. The real sacrifice is in manned surveillance, which might be better done with shore-based or even space-based platforms in any case.

The modern ASW platform of the eighties appears to be the new "Udaloy" class, which is in rapid series production. As previously mentioned, a new SAM is aboard, although little is known about the "SA-N-8" for which only weapons silos and unoccupied radar positions have been identified. It is probably a point defense missile system [Ref. 24: p. 518]. Long range air defense will be provided by the SA-N-6 platforms in the battlegroup. Otherwise, Udaloy's armament is purely ASW oriented, including the SS-N-14 and a hangar capable of accomodating two Helix helicopters. The

difference between two Helix helicopters and the single Hormones found on Kara and Kresta II is the difference between a nearly continuous localization and targeting capability against submarines out to at least the range of the SS-N-14, and a maintenence-limited quick reaction helicopter that relies much more on other sensors and platforms, and luck, to find the enemy submarine in the first place. It is a dramatic improvement and there are already nearly as many Udalcy units at sea and under construction as there were in the entire Kara program.

The Kirov/Udaloy battlegroup, then, more than replaces the Kiev/Kara/Kresta II formation on a ship-for-ship basis. And there will apparently be comparable numbers of these ships except for the Kirov, whose final number may be fewer than the four Kievs.

Two other shipbuilding programs are of special interest, then, because the context we have developed indicates that they are replacing, or, more likely considering the Soviet reluctance to scrap ships, augmenting, the old "Kynda" and "Kresta I" classes of cruise-missile strike ships. It is here that the greatest gains, both in modernity and in number, can be made.

The larger of the new strike ships is referred to as the Slava[33] class or, in the U.S. Department of Defense publication The Soviet Threat, as the "Krasina" class. Displacing about 13,000 tons she is considerably larger than the 9,600 ton Ticonderoga, which is the largest American cruiser under construction. Slava carries the long range SA-N-6 SAM and sixteen SS-N-12 cruise missiles in armored launchers, ready to fire. There is also the multiple close-in defensive weapons suite and a complete command and

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[33]Previously called BLK-COM-1, for "Black Sea combatant ship number 1", an accounting shorthand used by the western powers to refer to a Soviet ship that has not yet emerged from the building yards or been given a class name.

control capability [Ref. 25: p. 110]. Three of these ships are in various stages of preparation for operations, and because that seems to be an anomalous number on which to conclude a building program, there may be more built in the future.

The other very large building program that seems to have begun is the "Sovremenny" class guided missile destroyer.[34] Sovremenny is not best understood within the limitations imposed by the comparative arguments we have used here. As mentioned above, the 1960s strike cruisers achieved a defacto air defense capability by the capacity to lob an SS-N-3 out to 250nm. The most dramatic improvements in Soviet technology since these ships were designed and built, though, have been in the area of air defense systems, from the very close-in gatling guns to the very long range SAMs of the 1980s. Sovremenny carries a new medium range SAM, the SA-N-7, which seems to have a good capability against tactical targets, as well as further close-in defensive systems.[35] Cruise missile armament, then, need not provide

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[34]Though called a destroyer, this ship is larger than either of the cruiser classes (Kresta I or Kynda) that it could be considered to be replacing. The cruiser/destroyer distinction has outlived its usefulness and is avoided here as much as possible.

[35]The great hidden improvement provided by this new SAM as well as the SA-N-6 is their target handling capacity. Until the appearance of phased-array fire control radars for missiles (marked by the advent of the SA-N-6 for the Soviets) the number of targets per SAM was equal to the number or radars to guide the missiles. Another traditional limitation was the speed of the missile rail that mounted and fired the actual weapon. Kirov's design, as well as Slava's, puts the missiles in vertical silos and, of course, uses phased-array technology to permit several simultaneous target engagements per radar. Sovremenny and the SA-N-7 use a high-speed single arm launcher that is similar to the one used by the new American "Perry" class frigates. To achieve multiple-target handling capability they simply installed six widely separated fire control radars around the superstructure of the ship. This is a classic Soviet-style solution to the problem, because they achieve relatively high improvement in performance with a relatively low level of technological risk. It also occurs simultaneously with a riskier, breakthrough technology as represented by the SA-N-6.

the very long range buffer zone, especially if there is a Kirov or Slava around serving this function anyway.

Until the advent of the anti-ship Tomahawk there was no western cruise missile with the very long range required to accrue the air defense gains that the Soviets enjoyed. Western naval air defense, provided by fighter aircraft and superior SAMs, did not require it. But western cruise missiles were being built, with other capabilities that the Soviet missiles could not match. These missiles were smaller, faster, and they flew in lower to the ocean--all qualities that improved their likelihood of penetrating even the sophisticated Soviet anti-missile defense systems. Further, western ships, especially American combatants, began arming themselves to defeat the large Soviet missiles with pre-emptive systems and close-in gatling guns of their own.

The Sovremenny has installed aboard her a new cruise missile, the SS-N-22, that is probably much more like the supersonic sea-skimming missiles that the French have been turning out for years [Ref. 23: p. 367]. She also carries two mounts for a new rapid fire 130mm gun that is the largest gun installed aboard a Soviet ship since the WWII-technology Kotlin gun of the 1950s.

Sovremenny, then, seems to represent a departure from the pattern of ship designs and capabilities that has developed over thirty years. The role of the 1960s strike cruisers, to give long range striking power (and the consequent air defense advantages) to a formation centered on a Sverdlov or a Moskva, became obsolete as the Kiev and Kirov and now the "Slava" classes come on line with their own long range missiles and improved air defense. Given the capabilities of these new ships a group commander would still certainly choose a Sovremenny over a Kresta-I if simple replacement were the choice. But this new ship, especially

in the large numbers that seem to be under construction, offers the possibility of using the cruise missiles in a purely offensive context that has never been possible before. In the early 1980s, as the four Kievs, at least two Kirovs, and at least three Slavas become operational, battlegroups built around any one or two of these ships, and including the improved ASW destroyers such as the "Udaloy" class, the bastion defense mission will be so dramatically better served that it seems possible to imagine, in a relatively calm strategic environment, that a surface force of some might could be assembled for a third-world support mission. Adequate ready forces near the bastion areas could be maintained in case of emergency, or to prevent an increased American threat from forcing the immediate call-back of the expeditionary force. The capacity of the Soviet Navy to support interventionary forces deployed out of area will not be limited by lack of surface ships for a "non-strategic" mission.

Two important elements in the equation have not been dealt with at all here. The most obvious and important is the submarine question. The reason for omitting this force from consideration here is that the force most likely to deploy out of area for political intimidation purposes has historically been submarines. Our purpose here is to demonstrate that Soviet naval forces are or will imminently be capable of long out of area surface deployments to support Soviet military goals. The case for submarines is taken to have been demonstrated historically, and to be still more likely as the submarine force improves at least as dramatically as the surface force.

The other omission is the absence of speculation about the nature and capabilities of the hotly anticipated new Soviet conventional take-off and landing aircraft carrier. It is believed here that such a program is underway, but

that the extreme complexity of the task of operating a ship and airwing of the western type will preclude any operational capability for the first of these ships before the late 1990s. We will therefore consider this a matter still to be speculated upon, and likely with better sense, in about ten years.

B. THE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS

The Soviet force of amphibious ships has far less lift capacity than the force that could be mounted by the U.S. Navy to support and transport the Marine Corps. The Soviets show little inclination to threaten the U.S. with a massive buildup; no major improvements seem to be on the horizon since the second "Ivan Rogov" class LPD appeared. So the long range intervention mission, for which this force was not designed and is not well equipped, suffers some limitations in this area, though we will see that they are not as great as one might imagine before transcending the purely mirror-imaged comparison with U.S. forces.

The Ivan Rogov LPD (dock landing ship) is by far the largest amphibious ship in the Soviet inventory, at about 13,000 tons. When she appeared the size and design represented such a dramatic leap in capability that it was tempting to speculate that the long-range intervention mission in the American sense had become a priority for the U.S.S.R. Only the slow progress on the second unit and the apparent conclusion of the program at that point has led many experts to ultimately reject this notion, for she is a very capable ship. The primary lift capability is for one Naval Infantry Battalion,[36] which consists of about 409

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[36]Most information relating directly to the particulars of Soviet Naval Infantry manpower, equipment, training, or tactics comes from [Ref. 26]. Jane's and Polmar were also very valuable sources, and where conflicts were encountered, a compromise or consensus figure was given, leaning to the

perscnnel with 34 cf the BTR 60PA amphibious perscnnel carriers and other equipment.[37] Rogov can beach herself like any ccnventional tank landing ship, but with three to five Hormone transport helicopters aboard for vertical transport, and two "Lebed" class air cushion vehicles for fast seaborne movement, the option of staying offshore with such a valuable unit is very attractive. The Lebed is an 85 ton craft capable of transporting one or two PT-76 light tanks at over 50 knots, cver the top of most conventional beach obstacles and mines, and even up the beach itself to a protected position before unloading. A T-54/55 tank is too heavy and cannot be accommodated by the Lebed, so if Rogov is to carry them the ship must beach and use its bcw docrs.

Other important attributes of the Ivan Rogov "class" are the sophisticated ccmmand and control capability that permits her to direct the landing, a 122mm rocket launcher and a 76mm gun to prcvide fire support, and self defense against air attack that includes an SA-N-4 launcher and sets of paired gatling guns. Her range is estimated at 10-12,000nm at 12 knots, and Rogov has transferred from the Baltic tc the Pacific fleets and back in recent years.

The other long range amphibious ship in the Soviet inventory is the Alligator, which has a range of 6,000nm at 16 knots (14,000 at 10 knots). There are 14 of these 4500 ton tank landing ships, each of which can carry 1500-1700 tons of equipment, including a mix of up to 30 vehicles or 300 men. Their equipment includes a 15 ton crane and one or

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conservative side of capability estimates more often than not.

[37]An SNI regiment includes a tank battalion, which is equipped with 10 of the 36 metric ton T-54/55 medium tanks and 31 of the smaller 14 ton PT-76 amphibious tanks. All this heavy equipment will not go aboard an Ivan Rogov at once, so only an infantry battalion would fit aboard intact, but if other amphibious ships are around to supplement the force as many as 20 tanks can be carried by Rogov, alcng with men and other equipment.

two five-ton cranes, as well as a 57mm gun and rocket launchers. The DIA notes that ZSU 23-4 and SA-9 anti-aircraft weapons have been observed positioned on deck to augment the ships organic air defenses.[38] Alligators regularly operate in the Mediterrenean, off West Africa, and in the Indian Ocean with SNI troops embarked.

Since 1975, sixteen Ropucha LSTs have entered service. They continue to emerge from Gdansk shipyard in Poland at a rate of about two per year. Each can carry about 1000 tons, including about 225 to 275 troops and some vehicles, though not the 25 or so APCs this would account for. Thus, as Jane's points out [Ref. 24: p. 543], the high troop-to-vehicle ratio complements the opposite condition found on the Alligator LSTs. Though the range figure published is 3500nm at 16 knots (or 6000nm at 12), with proper replenishment these 3400 ton ships should be able to accompany Alligators as necessary on worldwide deployments.

Stepping down a rung, there is the 50 or so units of the "Polnocny" class, but at about 1000 tons, and with a range of only 3300nm, they will not be considered likely candidates for out of area deployment.

Another small ship, though, that deserves consideration is the "Aist" class air-cushion vehicle. It displaces 220 tons and can carry up to 70 tons, including a medium tank and 220 troops, or four PT-76 light tanks and 150 troops. Top speed is about 65 knots .and two 30mm cannon are mounted forward. This craft cannot be carried by any naval amphibious ship, but as we will see, could be useful if transported out of area by a merchant barge carrier. There are thirteen in the invertory. Another possible candidate for

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[38]These are, respectively, mobile gun and infrared missile systems that together form the air defense battery that is a part of every Naval Infantry Regiment. This particular incident was previously mentioned in section V. D. 3., the case study of the Angolan intervention of 1975-6.

merchant delivery is the 27 ton Gus air-cushion craft. A pure troop carrier, it can transport about 25 infantrymen and their equipment up to 230nm at cruising speed, or at up to 58 knots for shorter dashes. There are over 33 of these craft spread through the Pacific, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets.

C. AUXILIARIES AND MERCHANT SHIPS

An often cited limitation on the general capability of the Soviet military to operate out of area is the lack of basing facilities on foreign soil and the relative paucity of naval auxiliaries to fill in for this apparent gap. Although Admiral Gorshkov evinces a somewhat wistful tone as he does it, he, along with the rest of the Soviet military and political elite, take active pride in the fact that they need no bases overseas:

> "...reports periodically appearing in the Western press on the presence of certain naval bases belonging to the USSR on the territories of countries friendly to us are patently defamatory, seeking to conceal and justify the efforts of the imperialist powers to extend their military bases in many areas of the world....a Leninist peace-loving foreign policy is not after such acquisitions." [Ref. 5: p. 180]

What he is not suggesting, though, is that Soviet foreign policy does not require a strong overseas presence of Soviet ships. On the contrary, long and distant deployments are necessary, and the logistical problems inherant are solved, he states in the same paragraph, "with the aid of engineering-technical and design solutions" rather than bases. The facts are, of course, that when naval facilities can be arranged in critical overseas areas such as Egypt or Vietnam, they are, for as long as the host country can tolerate the arrangement. It is also worth pointing out here that while overseas basing initiatives have been

pursued more aggressively than ever since the statement above was published, the "engineering-technical" solutions have not followed the predictable course of building a large number of dedicated naval auxiliaries and large amphibious ships.

Part of the appearance of low lift capacity derives from the problem of mirror-imaging their military tanker fleet against our own, when theirs is designed for different commitments and deployment practices. Another is the difficulty of approximating the wartime surge capacity available in the merchant tankers and other auxiliaries that routinely, even in peacetime, are used to replenish naval combatant ships operating overseas.[39] This latter area represents a significant part of the technical solution that the Soviets are attempting.

The naval auxiliary fleet, like the amphibious fleet, features a spectacular artifact of the late 1970s that demonstrates a Soviet interest in overseas operations, but a lack of follow-through in the construction phase. Here we refer to the "Berezina" class AOR, which at 40,000 tons full load is by far the largest ship in the naval auxiliary fleet. Among the reasons that she attracted attention was the installation of an SA-N-4, two 57mm guns, four gatling guns, and even two ASW rocket launchers and a hull mounted sonar on this ship just as the rest of the auxiliary fleet was having its armament removed. This remains anomalous, but the Berezina deserves attention simply on her merits as a replenishment ship. Approximately 16,000 tons of fuel oil and deisel, 500 tons of fresh water, and 2-3000 tons of provisions, munitions, and spare parts are carried. There are refueling stations on each side and astern, as well as

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[39]The general capability of the Soviet Merchant Marine as well as the auxiliary forces to support the navy is considered in some detail in [Ref. 27].

solid stores transfer rigs port and starboard. Significant for their novelty in the Soviet fleet are the helicopter pad and two-Hormone hangar for vertical replenishment, and the apparent presence of excess berthing space that could be used by turnover crews or troops to be sent ashore. Vertical replenishment is more important than it might seem at first glance because it has traditionally been in the area of solid stores transfer that Soviet auxiliaries have lagged behind western techniques, and in the specific category of weapons transfer at sea, there is no reference available that describes the Soviet Navy actually doing this. Vertical replenishment is probably the safest and most efficient way to transfer weapons, so the Berezina provides two helicopters for this purpose where before the naval replenishment fleet had none.

The next largest auxiliary is the "Boris Chilikin" class AOR, of which there are six subordinated to the Navy. These are 24,000 ton ships with about 20% less payload than Berezina across the board, and of course no helicopters or extra berthing. Other significant auxiliaries with intercontinental range include the "Dubna," "Olekma," "Kazbek," "Uda," and "Altay" classes. Each is capable of underway replenishment of at least liquids. The 62,000 ton Sofia is a small supertanker that is used in the Indian Ocean to refuel other tankers that then disperse to refuel combatants. There are also, of course, many auxiliaries used for replenishment of provisions, refrigerated stores, dry stores, etc.

Before we turn to the merchant ships, there are several ship types whose imaginative use could contribute significantly to an out of area naval adventure. The two "Ob" class hospital ships that were built in Poland in the late 1970s and recently became operationally available have obvious utility when the fighting actually begins. They are

11,000 tcn vessels with seven operating rooms each and as many as 500 beds in their hospital facilities. Each also has a hangar for the Hormone C that would be used to transport casualties or whatever cther cargo needed to be flcwn from shir tc ship or ship to shore. Ob herself is based in the Pacific Fleet and Yenesey in the Baltic. Transit to the scene of an amphibious operation would probably not see the 500 beds empty, especially in an amphibious force only recently building enough berthing space for the Naval Infantry trcops needed to operate the equipment that can be carried.[40] Another interesting group of ships is the missile range instrumentation ships used to monitor missile tests and space flights. Each of the eight "Vytegrales," two "Desna," and four "Sabir" class ships has a helicopter pad and air search radars for early warning against air attack if that role becomes more appropriate than missile tracking. Fishing fleet factory ships are not only an obvious source of canned tuna, but each also represents another transport helicopter and landing pad at sea.

As ncted earlier, any distinction between naval auxiliaries and "civilian" merchantmen in the Soviet Union is purely administrative, and if the British can mobilize privately cwned ships as quickly as they did for the Falklands campaign, one is tempted to suspect that the Soviets would have little difficulty redirecting their assets in a similar way. With this in mind, and the amphibious possibilities fcremost, the editors of Jane's include a category called "Auxiliary Amphibious Ships," which they intrcduced in 1983 with the following note:

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[40]Jane's also points out that the Soviet Union has the world's largest passenger fleet of about 500,000 tons, which could, if called upon, transport about 40,000 troops at once [Ref. 24: p. 545].

AD-A146 631 THE LIMITS OF INTERVENTION: SOVIET NAVAL POWER PROJECTION CAPABILITIES AND THE DECISION TO INTERVENE (U) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA G D HOLLIDAY 2/2

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



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"The rapid expansion of the Soviet general cargo fleet that took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s has been followed in recent years by a similar expansion in specialist tonnage of types directly of value to naval support or amphibious activities. The integrated command structure controlling all merchant ship activities, which has naval staff at each separate 'company' office and a core of naval personnel on each ship, has for many years enabled individual merchant ships, especially tankers, to be rerouted from normal commercial trading to act as fleet support ships.... By 1984, four large barge carriers will be in service, with a further five smaller ships (the new Valmet feeder ships and the three 'Stakhanovets' class) being able to operate as LPDs.... This is exactly the type of amphibious capability that would be essential in any future conflict. The ships would require little or no modification before being employed in a military role." [Ref. 24: p. 545]

The largest of the the four barge carriers referred to by Jane's are the Aleksey Kosygin and the similar sized but nuclear powered unit under construction in the Black Sea. Each displaces over 60,000 tons and has a 500 ton gantry crane for handling LASH type barges or most other cargo carrying platforms that can operate out of the back of a ship. Either of these units could transport and deploy several of the 220 ton "Aist" class air cushion vehicles.

There are also two "Yulius Fuchik" type barge carriers in the Soviet inventory which are about the same size as the LASH carriers. They might be even better suited to the air cushion vehicle mothership role, as each has a barge elevator on its stern which is capable of hoisting two 1300 ton SEEBEE*1 barges at once. Admiral Gorshkov singles out these American-designed ships for specific mention in Seapower, noting that each is "...capable of carrying a motorized rifle brigade....the troops (of which) may be

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*1SEEBEE barges are 38X11 meters each, making the elevator at least 38X22 meters. Lebed ACVs, at 25X11 meters would fit neatly, even two at once. Aist ACVs are 47X17 meters, which suggests that there would be some overhang if they were placed on the elevator, similar to the overhang observed when tactical aircraft are lifted on deck-edge elevators aboard U.S. aircraft carriers. A fully loaded Aist would not weigh even ten percent of the lift capacity of the elevator. Some of this data is found in [Ref. 28].

landed on a poorly-equipped shore."[42] All these ships have ranges of at least 12,000 miles. The five smaller barge carriers mentioned are capable of accommodating "Lebed" or "Gus" class ACVs.

More traditional, if less spectacular methods of getting ashore involve simply driving an amphibious vehicle out of a ship directly into the water and to the beach. (As we noted before, all the vehicles used by the Soviet Naval Infantry, with the exception of the medium tanks, are amphibious). Peter Hertel Rasmussen points out [Ref. 20: p. 154] that civilian RO-RO ships have been observed disgorging amphibious vehicles during exercises in the Baltic. Since 1975 the Soviets have added at least 40 RO-RO ships of various sizes to their inventory. Most have been built in foreign (usually Finnish or Polish) yards, but Norman Polmar notes that one class was designed and built by the Soviets themselves with two 25,000 horsepower gas turbine engines that produce a top speed of around 25 knots:

> "Apparently the Soviet government felt the need for a small number of faster container ships, and the Nikolaev south yard built the 'Kapitan Smirnov' class of combination container-RORO ships." [Ref. 23: p. 415]

The applicability of these attributes to the "rapid-deployment force" mission speaks for itself. The overall capacity of the Soviet RORO/LASH fleet is very large, and will be summed in the context of amphibious assault in the next chapter.

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[42]It is worth noting that the second edition of the book (1979) gave the topic of ships with "horizontal loading and unloading facilities" almost twice as many lines as the first, emphasizing the capabilities of LASH-type ships to handle "large-size cargoes unsuitable for containerization" at high efficiencies and without shore facilities.

D. THE SOVIET NAVAL INFANTRY

The number, size, and type of the larger weapons and vehicles in a regiment of Soviet Naval Infantry is shown in Table VI. It is assused that smaller items of gear and most of the troops will be transported in the vehicles themselves, which is the standard practice.

TABLE VI

Soviet Naval Infantry Regiment

#	Vehicle	Tons	Sq. m.
10	T-54/55 Tank	36	20.46
34	PT-76 Tank	14	21.39
111	BTR-60 APC	10.2	20.16
18	BRDM Recon	7	13.68
6	BM-21 RktLnchr	13.3	20
4	ZSU-23-4 AAA	20.5	18.85
4	Sa-9 SAM	7	13.68
3	K-61 Trnsprt	9.5	29.44

All these vehicles are amphibious with the exception of the T-54/55 tanks, and the K-61 vehicle can carry either 60 troops or five metric tons of cargo from a ship to the beach. Assuming 75% efficiency in vehicle loading we can add 25% to the deck area taken for each vehicle and multiply it by the total number of each type for the vehicle loading area in square meters for an SNI regiment. The figure one arrives at is 4,817 square meters of deck space used for the loading of vehicles only. To be properly conservative we will round this figure up to 5,000 and double it to arrive at a guess as to the square meters of deck space required for the entire regiment including the equipment that is not loaded onto the vehicles during the actual transit. Using a

similar method we arrive at 5,000 metric tons for the weight of the 10,000 square meters of cargo. The manpower of the regiment is established by DIA as 2,038 men.

Table VII gives the order of battle of each of the fleet areas in terms of regiments and ocean-going amphibious ships [Ref. 30].

TABLE VII

Soviet Naval Infantry by Fleet

FLEET:	NORTHERN	BALTIC	BLACK SEA	PACIFIC
SNI:	1 rgmnt	1 rgmnt	1 rgmnt	2 rgmnts
Ivan Rogov	0	2	0	0
Alligator	2	2	5	5
Ropucha	3	4	0	7

Some extra attention to the Pacific Fleet SNI force is also worthwhile. This has long been a different force from that present in the other fleets. The unclassified DIA Defense Intelligence Report [Ref. 26: p. vii] invites a raised eyebrow when it introduces the parts and their sum this way:

> "Today the Soviet Naval Infantry numbers about 12,000 men. Single naval infantry regiments are stationed in the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleet areas, and at least two regiments with the Pacific Ocean Fleet. Each regiment is composed of about 2000 men..."

It doesn't quite add up. And the unclassified naval order of battle used for the figures above gives a total of 13,000 SNI troops in 1982, suggesting that some augmentation is underway in any case. The defector who calls himself Viktor

Suvorov offers an interesting clue in his recent book Inside the Soviet Army:

> "The Soviet Navy has only one brigade of marine infantry. This belongs to the Pacific Fleet. It consists of two tank and five motor-rifle battalions and is equipped with especially heavy artillery. This brigade is sometimes mistakenly taken (sic) for two independent regiments of marine infantry."[43]

If this is so, what impact does it have on our calculations? Suvorov does not specify whether the tank battalions are naval infantry type (with mostly amphibious tanks) or the ground forces type, with medium tanks like the T-72. Since he calls the organization a brigade, and refers to motor-rifle battalions and heavy artillery, none of which are characteristic of "typical" SNI organization and equipment, we will assume that the Army units that have these names provide the best model.

A typical Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment has three motorized rifle battalions and one medium tank battalion.[44] Two of these regiments, obviously, make a force similar to Suvorov's Pacific Brigade. Among the Division level assets that would be needed to make the brigade autonomous would be artillery, air defense, and perhaps anti-tank and mortar groups. Suvorov mentions the artillery, of course, suggesting that it is the larger 122mm self-propelled

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[43][Ref. 31: p. 87]. His next paragraph is also interesting: "The Soviet marine infantry has a very promising future. In the next few years it will receive new types of equipment which will enable it to put large units into action against distant targets. Special combat equipment is being developed for such operations by the marine infantry." The type of "equipment" he is referring to is not specified, but since no large amphibious ships are under construction, one wonders if he means the large "civilian" ships that we will consider in the next section, or even the Wing In Ground Effect (WIG) aircraft that Admiral Gorshkov has been referring to for years, and which might indeed have SNI transport applications that will be considered below.

[44]All hard data on the size, configuration, and equipment of Soviet Army units is taken from two unclassified DIA reports: [Ref. 32], and [Ref. 33].

amphibious artillery pieces rather than just the mortars and rockets common to naval infantry forces. A battalion would consist of eighteen of these large weapons. The air defense battery would consist of four ZSU-23-4 and four SA-9, as it does in a standard SNI regiment, or it might include the fully mobile SA-6 that the Soviet Army has at the regimental level. The amphibious, and lighter ZSU/SA-9 combination will be assumed, but when this is added to the 64 T-72 tanks (at 41 tons apiece), 165 BMPs (about 13.5 tons), 45 or so large trucks and other vehicles, and about 2500 men that are called for by the tank and motorized rifle battalions, then it becomes clear that the Pacific Brigade, if in fact augmented to this degree, weighs about 14,000 tons and uses about 14,000 square meters of deck space.[45]

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[45]The same method as above was used in these calculations. The large number of tanks and the use of BMPs for infantry carriers increases the "density" of this type of brigade considerably over what is normal for a Naval Infantry regiment. The corresponding figures for two standard regiments in the Pacific Fleet are 10,000 tons and 20,000 square meters.

VIII. AGGREGATING THE ASSETS

So far the narrative description of Soviet naval assets for distant intervention has been only partially useful in determining what the actual capability is. Very much in the tradition of writings on this topic, this has been a serial listing of the order of battle in the appropriate categories with suggestions of how the particular units might be used. This is an intuitively understandable, even necessary part of the process of understanding, but ultimately insufficient if the desire is to realistically project what the Soviets might be able to do in a given situation. In the course of describing the new Soviet combatant ships, some time was spent on defining the numbers of large units that are being built, and for purposes of this analysis we will not go much further than to say that the absolute numbers of these ships and certainly the overall capabilities are increasing to the point that a "secondary" mission such as support for Soviet forces in a non-strategic intervention to actively carry out the defense of socialism is well within reach now. The problems of air defense outside the reach of land-based tactical aircraft have been dealt with in a "scientific" and economical way by simply building superior SAMs. For anything less than a major sea battle with large-scale U.S. naval forces, this is probably adequate. The anti-ship strike threat is more dramatic than ever now, and can be offered as a genuinely offensive gesture to even American naval forces with the expectation that it will be respected. The ships now exist, or will very soon, to credibly threaten severe losses for any power that would attack a deployed Soviet amphibious formation, while at the same time defending the contiguous seas that would be needed as SSBN

basticns. The Soviets have a navy that is capable of carrying out its strategic mission both offensively and defensively while deploying operational** or tactical forces to any part of the world ocean.

The other types of forces, amphibious, auxiliary, and merchant, can all be considered as elements in the system for the transportation of supplies and equipment to distant parts. But in order to operationalize the matter at all, the specific types of materials that must be transported for our purpose have to be related in size, shape, weight, and quantitiy to the types of ships available. John A. Jederlinic and Larry K. Luckeroth note that the plethora of ship types and high degree of specialization in ship designs make it:

> "...very difficult for the logistics planner to develop meaningful models because of the difficulty delineating common denominators by which all ships could be evaluated." [Ref. 29]

The problem is one of seeing the forest for the trees, and their paper offered an improved method of aggregating measures of ship usefulness to the tasks of maritime transport of military goods. The Jederlinic/Luckeroth method will be outlined below, but it is worthwhile first to understand the "select ship concept," upon which their method improves by expanding versatility and avoiding certain pitfalls of oversimplification.

**The term "operational" can be misleading to a western reader when it is used in the context favored by Soviet military writers. It's meaning falls between what we would think of as strategic or tactical. A useful guideline is to think of an operational level activity as one that is nationally directed and important on a national scale (thus larger than "tactical"), but not potentially decisive for national survival, or the survival of the communist system, which would be "strategic."

A. METHODS OF AGGREGATION

The select ship concept simplifies the aggregation problem by simply omitting from consideration any ship that does not meet certain minimum standards of speed, range, and maximum single boom cargo lift capacity. For the limited scenario against which it was conceived, which was transoceanic administrative sealift by merchant ships in support of an amphibious operation, it was useful. This is actually the sort of operation that American or British merchant ships might reasonably be, and in the case of the Falklands were, called upon to carry out. But traditionally the Soviet Naval Infantry mission has been defined, at least in the West, as being directed at support of the ground forces closer to the forward edge of the battle area, and as a part of a larger conflict. Exercises in the Baltic, for example, are seen as rather direct dress rehersals for flanking operations that might accompany a Soviet thrust across the Northern Plain of Western Europe, and Rasmussen notes that:

> "...the naval infantry of the Pacific fleet has conducted a number of landings in the Kuril Islands. It is believed that one of their war-time missions would be to secure these islands by invading them and holding them against attempts from other Pacific powers to occupy them." [Ref. 20: p. 157]

The select ship method is not a good way to define the sort of ships necessary to carry out such short range, small scale activities.

Other, more specific objections to the select ship method include the oversimplification involved in making all qualifying select ships of equal value for accounting purposes, and the disqualification of many very capable ships for failure to meet a single standard, such as boom capacity, when it has adequate range and speed and may, in fact, have an alternate method of offloading cargo that is

even better suited to the situation under consideration. The minimum requirement for boom capacity is generally pegged to the weight of a main battle tank, as a definitional type of cargo that must get ashore. Select ships for transporting U.S. forces would need, then, a 60-ton crane to be considered.

The improved Jederlinic/Luckeroth method achieves a better measure by establishing interval scales of:

1. Deck space. It is presented as a better measure of military cargo than cubic meters because so much of the cargo in question is outsized, cannot be stacked, and wastes a great deal of a ship's cubic space.
2. Cargo handling factor. Here a set of regular intervals are chosen, descending from the weight of a main battle tank, to measure ton capacity of the largest crane aboard the ship.
3. Service speed factor. A high tactical transit speed for merchant ships is chosen as a floor for the highest ratings and a series of gradations are defined down to the lowest rating, which might represent a maximum service speed of less than, say, 12 knots.

Ships ratings in each category are taken on a scale of perhaps one to five, and the ratings are simply summed, and the resultant for each ship is applied to a fourth, overall scale, that categorizes ships for their general relative merits with all factors considered.

Although this method avoids the worst of the disadvantages of the select ship system, which is the total omission of ships not meeting the standards of a single category, and it holds up the possibility of changing the standards as required to measure the ships against a specific scenario, in the end it offers somewhat less than one might reasonably hope. At the price of a considerable increase in complexity

it ultimately offers only a four level aggregate scale in which each of the three factors are given equal weight. The dependence of the select ship measure to the scenario of a long distance intervention stems only from the use of a range cutoff as one of the selection criteria, and it is as easy to change a variable in a modified select ship approach as it is to offer a different variable in another system. The new measure seems to be an improvement of degree rather than kind, certainly, but doesn't ultimately respond to the real problem of describing adequately the utility of revolutionary new types of ships to the task of supporting amphibious operations.

This analysis is concerned specifically with the sort of situation that the select ship system was designed for, so the temptation is great to simply proceed with it. But the challenge laid down by the analysts cited is a legitimate one, and it seems to be manageably simple to devise a measurement that applies to the transfer of Soviet forces over long distances to land SNI troops and support them.

A modified version of the select ship method will be suggested then, that specifically considers the ships available to the Soviet Navy and merchant marine that could support various levels of intervention in areas distant from the Soviet fleet areas. This version will be scenario dependent in the same sense that select ship is prone to be, but the measures of ships required will be defined based upon a larger sense of the progress of an intervention as it might proceed from a small, surprise landing (as was implicitly threatened by the Alligator off Guinea in the early 1970s) up through and including the largest scale intervention that the combined forces of the SNI, amphibious-trained army troops, and other available forces could muster.

B. LEVELS OF INTERVENTION

It is difficult for Americans to think of an amphibious operation as anything less than the familiar spectacles of Inchon or the Pacific Campaign of World War Two. There are obviously smaller scale actions, and it is the capability to carry out several fairly small scale interventions simultaneously that distinguishes the United States Marine Corps from any other naval infantry force in the world. The Soviets, by designing the Ivan Rogov ships around a capacity to transport a battalion of SNI, have created a baseline definition of what we will here consider the smallest significant interventionary force. This is not so much to dismiss as insignificant a force like the pair of Alligators often seen off the coast of Cyprus as it is to raise the threshold of what we would choose to call an important new demonstration of Soviet amphibious capability. The transits of Rogovs to and from the Pacific demonstrated in a practical way the feasibility of worldwide movement on this scale (although it must be noted that the rate of movement was leisurely and the amphibious landing demonstration performed for the South Yemenis was reportedly uninspiring).

The next level to be considered is the largest possible intervention that could be generated with naval and SNI forces only. That is, naval auxiliaries supporting naval combatants and amphibious ships with no extraordinary assistence from the merchant forces and no general mobilization of non-naval forces to assist in the early phases of the operation.

The third level will be a distant area sea intervention on the largest scale that the Soviets could possibly muster, using all naval infantry forces, airborne, and amphibious-trained Army troops that could be transported.

The reason for dividing the analysis this way derives from the operationalization of material transportation we introduced above; the measure of the usefulness of a ship has to be determined by its intended cargo as much as possible. There are significant departures in the types of equipment required when each jump in scale is made. For example, at the level of intervention limited to naval and SNI forces, the fact that only four regiments of SNI exist, and each has only ten medium tanks, suggests that one large ship with a forty ton crane could handle the lot of them. That is, given that ship we could let the 20.5 ton weight of the ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft weapon, which is the next heaviest single piece of gear, be the limiting factor for lift capacity, defining what other ships (and cranes) would be required. But since there are only four of these per regiment, we could let them ride with the T-54/55 tanks and take 14 tons, which is the weight of the amphibious PT-76 tank, as the critical level of lift capacity. It is probably not coincidental that the 14 Alligator LSTs are equipped with a fifteen-ton crane as their largest lifting device.

1. Naval Infantry and Naval Sealift

The measurements of the ships are not simple to establish, but Table VIII gives the best approximations available in open sources. The data for Ivan Rogov is given in the least convenient units, but we can obviate the awkwardness of this by simply subtracting the square meters calculable from Table VI, using the same formula, and guessing that the ship can carry at least 2,000 tons if an Alligator can carry 1,700. Thus the Rogov reduces the remaining regimental lift requirement to about 3,000 tons, maybe 7,600 square meters, and about 1,500 men.

TABLE VIII

Ship capacities

#	Ship	Tons	Msq.	Troops
2	Rogov	?2000	?2400	522
14	Alligator	1700	?2000	?100
16	Ropucha	450	600	230
1	Berezina	2000+	?3000	?500
6	Chilikin	1200	?1500	0
6	Dubna	?1000	1347	0

The Baltic Fleet order of battle for amphibicus ships presently includes both of the Ivan Rogov units, two Alligator LSTs, and four Ropucha LSTs. Because of the presence, at least temporarily, of both Rogovs,[47] it seems likely that the regiment of SNI based in this fleet is the most likely candidate for overseas deployment. So the lift capacities of the six remaining ships are subtracted from the regisental requirements after the loading of the single available Ivan Rcgov (this, of course, assumes 100% availability of the other amphibians, which is impossible navy-wide, but imaginable for this small number of ships within a single fleet, raised to full readiness for a specific, high priority operation). Simple subtraction shows that the requirement for tonnage is met with a considerable margin, and that further lift capacity is needed only for ancther 1200 square meters of bulk cargo and another 400 troops.

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[47]The original hull is probably involved in a major overhaul and refit based upon the lessons learned during its time at sea. The second unit took so long to produce that it was supposed that these lessons were being incorporated into the Aleksandr Nikolaev while it was in the building yards. As of winter 1984, the Nikolaev appears to be a likely transfer to the Pacific Fleet.

Interestingly, the Berezina AOR might meet these requirements by herself. The two most important departures from normal fleet oiler design that she represents are her relatively larger dry cargo capacity compared to previous Soviet designs (with improved means of transferring it while underway) and the "crew" capacity of about 600, which seems higher than the number needed to man the ship. These capabilities are useful for any number of reasons, including the transportation of relief crews to distantly deployed units on routine missions, but they are also very well suited to the needs of the Baltic Soviet Naval Infantry regiment if it was to be deployed for a distant intervention.[48] Other auxiliaries could perform the dry cargo part of the mission, and any of these, combined with either of the "Ob" class hospital ships, could do the chore as well as Berezina and provide the medical care that would be required as well.

So the Baltic regiment seems transportable, but what are the limits if more than a regiment of SNI are considered necessary? Table VII provided the order of battle of each of the Soviet fleets in SNI related measures. It would seem initially apparent from our calculations that independent movements over large distances are possible on the regimental scale only from the Baltic and the Pacific fleets (for one of the two PACFLT regiments).

A closer look reveals the ease with which a little bit of preparation and asset juggling makes the Soviet Naval Infantry a threat for long range intervention on the regimental scale from any one or maybe two of the fleet areas. Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of denuding strategic areas of SNI assets that presumably exist because

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[48]The Berezina need not be based in the Baltic, and would not even have to stage there, since her cargo would not necessarily include even vehicles, only dry cargo and supplies, and the troops to be transported could be flown in from the Baltic to retain regimental integrity.

TABLE IX

Fleet Requirements vs. Lift

	Tons	Sq. m.	Men
PACIFIC FLEET			
5 Gators	8500	10,000	500
7 Ropucha	3150	4200	1610
Total	11,650	14,200	2110
Need	10,000	20,000	4080
Difference	Surplus	-5800	-1970
BLACK SEA FLEET			
5 Gators	8500	10,000	500
Need	5000	10,000	2038
Difference	Surplus	0	-1538
NORTHERN FLEET			
2 Gators	3400	4000	200
3 Ropucha	1350	1800	690
Total	4750	5800	890
Need	5000	10,000	2038
Difference	-250	-4200	-1148
BALTIC FLEET			
1 Rogov	2000	2400	522
2 Gators	3400	4000	200
4 Ropucha	1800	2400	920
(6 Ropucha)	(2700)	(3600)	(1380)
Total	7200 (8100)	8800 (10,000)	1640 (2102)
Need	5000	10,000	2038
Difference	Surplus (Surp)	-1200 (0)	-396 (Surp)

they are needed where they are, and continuing to ignore the "Polnccny" class larding ships because they are too small for our purposes (even though they are capable of carrying out the shcrt range strategic transits), the simple mathematics of transport in the four fleet areas is illustrated in Table IX. For each fleet, the available transport capability is calculated, using the order of battle given in

Table VII, in terms of tons, square meters, and troops. (Note that the Baltic is given credit for only one of the Ivan Rogov units.) The requirements of each fleet to transport the SNI present there (two regiments in the case of the Pacific Fleet) is then calculated, and the surplus or shortfall presented in boldface.

The immediate conclusion from the table is that the Pacific Fleet has a serious shortage in bulk transport capacity and personnel transport, but could probably lift a 14,000 ton/14,000 square meter/2500 man "Suvorov brigade" with the readdition of the Rogov and the use of the Berezina. Even given the offical two regiments, the heavy lift capacity seems to be there, and the addition of the Rogov plus the Berezina and perhaps one of the hospital ships brings all of the catagories to within striking range of requirements given the margin of error in these figures. The Black Sea Fleet falls short in the area of personnel transport only, which could be easily made up by one of the hospital ships or one of the many passenger liners based in this fleet area. The Northern Fleet has fairly serious shortfalls across the board, but its strategic value in area** makes it the least likely to deploy independently anyway. The Baltic Fleet has manageably slim shortfalls in the bulk and personnel categories, as we have mentioned. An interesting observation can be made with regard to the Baltic Fleet. The total Soviet order of battle for Ropucha LSTs is given in the 1983-84 edition of Jane's as sixteen ships. The DIA order of battle [Ref. 30] from which the

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**Possible wartime roles that are "in area" or our purposes include seizure of northern Norweigian or even Icelandic airfields as part an overall war plan for keeping the Northern Fleet and the SSBN "bastions" secure. If the Northern Fleet SNI forces are kept in a "war reserve" status in order to be available for these missions, then they would not be likely candidates for Third World intervention. Exercise Zapad 81 (see below) indicates that any such reserve status for the SNI or its ships is subject to temporary modification if it exists at all.

data in Table VII is taken shows only 14 total Ropuchas, with four of them in the Baltic Fleet. Since the ships are built in the Baltic at a rate of two per year, it seemed worthwhile to try the assumption that the ships had been built and had been assigned to the Baltic Fleet, but that they had not yet met the requirements for inclusion in the DIA order of battle. The results are given in parentheses. These two Ropuchas rather neatly close the gap in long-range lift capability without relying on auxiliaries, hospital ships, or other sources of lift capacity.

The regiments that seem most likely to be transported over long distances intact, then, are the Baltic and the Black Sea. The anamolous Pacific brigade cannot be lifted as a unit with local assets, but does have a large lift capability and could be partially deployed in greater strength than any of the other fleets. As we will see, the lack of naval subordinated lift is a constraint that we impose upon ourselves, and one which the Soviets may not feel bound by any more than the British did.

Finally, the obvious question of combining elements of each of the four fleets into one, larger force, rather than assuming deployments from within a single fleet, must be dealt with. If there is indeed a strategic, wartime function for the SNI in the immediate fleet areas that precludes the wholesale deployment of these forces to distant waters, then a combined force from all fleets would be the only way to generate enough strength for a significant intervention.

In September 1981 the Soviets used this technique in an exercise called Zapad 81 to land, on the Soviet Baltic shores, a larger force than they had ever before attempted in peacetime [Ref. 34: pp. 232-234]. Over the course of July and August the reinforcements included two Alligators from the Black Sea Fleet, three Ropuchas and two more

Alligators (carrying tanks) from the Northern Fleet, and the Ivan Rogov all the way from the Pacific Fleet. Ultimately, 5000to 6000 SNI troops with 200 medium tanks were assembled for the exercise. Also present were the Kiev and the "Moskva" class helicopter cruiser Leningrad, from operations in the Mediterranean. Rasmussen points out that these transits did not denude the Northern Fleet amphibious capability because the Forty-Fifth Motor Rifle Division from Murmansk was trained in amphibious operations. As significantly, he notes that "sizable parts of the Baltic Red Banner Fleet took no part in the exercise." The Baltic fleet could carry on with its responsibilities independently of the exercise, if at a somewhat lower level.

The Soviets have demonstrated, then, a capability to establish a force of 5000 SNI troops from the different fleets and to coordinate them in an amphibious landing. Zapad 81 was not, of course, "far from home" in the sense that this thesis is considering possible future interventions; it was on Soviet soil. But significant parts of the amphibious and surface forces used did transit over distances exceeding those called for by the traditional SNI mission of securing local fleet areas. Adding up the combined lift capacity of just the amphibious ships that transited from another fleet to be present for the exercise gives a total of over 10,000 tons, 12,000 square meters, and about 1600 men. If the Baltic Fleet provided two Alligators and two Ropuchas to an overseas intervention (a proportion between that offered by the Northern Fleet, which was denuded of heavy lift, and the Pacific Fleet) than the combined lift would be adequate for even a Suvorov-type, reinforced naval infantry "brigade."

The larger lesson of Zapad 81 is the willingness of the Soviets to combine forces from all services and the "civilian" shipping sector into a unified task force. The

physical limits of this approach for Third World intervention will be discussed in the next section.

2. Combined Forces Interventions

The Zapad 81 combination of naval, air, and ground forces is consistent with the current conventional thinking on the mission of the Soviet Naval Infantry, which holds that SNI forces secure peripheral areas of the Soviet Union in a larger war and are followed by a consolidating force of army troops, by land or by sea. This "combined arms" approach to solving military problems is a cornerstone of Soviet military thinking, and must be considered in this analysis. Although there are no examples of large-scale overseas Soviet military actions to draw upon, it seems reasonable to expect that any future intervention in the Third World would, to the extent possible, make use of the doctrine and skills that have been developed in exercises such as Zapad-81.

Soviet Naval Infantry doctrine is expressed within the larger context of the role it plays in combined arms operations including ground forces and airborne forces as well [Ref. 26: p. 23]. Specifically, the initial landing should be coordinated with an airborne landing in the enemy rear area, and SNI involvement ends when the secure beachhead has permitted the landing of the regular ground forces that will carry out the larger military objective. At this point the Naval Infantry forces are actually withdrawn from the scene of combat. To begin to understand the actual limits of intervention on the largest scale reasonable, then, we must be assured of the capability of the airborne forces to play an appropriate role and for the ground forces to be transported in adequate number and by "select ships" with the correct capabilities for putting them ashore.

3. The Scenario

The five phases of a Soviet amphibious assault are listed below: [Ref. 26: p. 23]

1. Preparation of equipment and amphibious units.
2. Embarkation of personnel and loading of equipment on ships and transports.
3. Movement by sea to the objective area.
4. The battle for the beachhead by the amphibious units.
5. Landing of ground forces and withdrawal of the naval infantry.

The first three of these are relatively straightforward, but the last two should be developed in further detail before conclusions can be reached about the number and types of ships needed for such an assault.

In Soviet doctrine the size of the amphibious force used to open the beachhead of the following ground forces is dependent upon the type and number of enemy defenses, but against a defended coastal area a "battalion assault force" is typical. A battalion, of course, is a small enough force to be transported intact on a single "Ivan Rogov" class ship, but as we have shown above, with purely organic assets the Soviet Naval Infantry can mount a force several times this size for overseas deployment.

A typical naval infantry assault begins with shore bombardment of enemy defenses (naval gunfire and rockets) combined with tactical air support to assist in the bombardment and to achieve air superiority. Targets ashore would have been scouted by special forces of either the naval infantry or the airborne forces. Soviet paratroopers (as few as a company, but as many as needed) drop into the enemy rear area to cut lines of communication, secure key terrain, and disrupt movement of enemy reinforcements. An SNI reconnaissance platoon equipped with one PT-76 amphibious tank

and three BRDMs goes ashore as a group of combat engineers land by helicopter to mark and clear three lanes for the battalion assault force.[50] The reconnaissance platoon proceeds inland far enough to direct naval gunfire and supporting airstrikes against shore defenses. The first wave of naval infantry comes ashore in three PT-76s and ten BTR-60PB armored personnel carriers. These vehicles fire their main weapons against shore defenses as they swim in, then widen the beachhead when they come ashore. The second wave, similarly equipped, goes ashore in the same manner, followed by mortar, antitank, and air defense platoons. The battalion commander goes ashore at this time to take overall command to the beach as naval gunfire and air support moves farther inland. The third wave lands, as directed by the commander ashore, and is followed by rear support forces to establish supply points, etc. The reconnaissance platoon is at this time establishing contact with the airborne company that is advancing toward the beachhead. When the routes inland are cleared and marked, the beachhead secured, and ground forces have relieved the SNI and airborne forces, the latter are removed.

The scenario above [Ref. 26: pp. 32-34] by no means represents the limits of naval infantry employment or tactics. The Soviets have used air-cushion vehicles, for example, in amphibious landings and are capable of other imaginative tactics as situations call for them. Some of these will be develcped when the capability to circumvent the limitations of the assault force are considered below.

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[50]It is worth noting that this is the only place in the DIA "doctrine" that helicopters are required. Exercise Zapad 81 included 31 helicopters as part of the amphibious force [Ref. 34: p. 233] and Gorshkov [Ref. 5] specifically mentions advances that can be made in the use of helicopters for improved amphibious tactics, so one is well advised not to consider this typical assault as limiting in any way.

4. Potential Limitations

Some areas of potential difficulty for a Soviet intervention planner are outlined below:

1. Lack of surprise. A large scale amphibious force would surely be detected by the West as it was forming--certainly as it deployed--and the potential targets would probably be few.
2. Air cover. Soviet doctrine for amphibious assault includes close air support and fighter cover from tactical aircraft based, obviously, within their own "combat radius" of the conflict.
3. Adequacy of transport capability. The quantitative capacity of Soviet shipping to transport large numbers of ground forces has not been demonstrated over intercontinental distances. The qualitative suitability of Soviet ships to actually put ground forces ashore in a range of situations is a non-trivial problem.
4. Command and control. Zapad-81 was directed by the Minister of Defense, Marshal Ustinov, personally [Ref. 34: p. 232]. It would be expected that any large scale intervention would feature multiple, redundant means of communication with Moscow. Coordination of airborne, navy, naval infantry, and ground forces on a distant site would be especially difficult.

5. Specific Capabilities

Before Soviet intervention capabilities are measured against the limitations noted above, it is worthwhile to consider what might actually be required in third-world intervention scenarios that one can imagine. No attempt will be made to narrow the measurement to a set of specific

requirements that characterize all possible such situations, but one can look back into the historical record for potential landing scenarios that were not taken up by Soviet forces. The Angolan and Ethiopian interventions, in which large numbers of Cuban forces were used, come to mind. In these cases there was no resistence at the points of troop debarkation. Options not exercised in these cases, though, include flanking assaults against UNITA or Somali positions which were accessible only by sea. A more fertile line of speculation is to look into the future at potential areas for Soviet intervention. On the African continent, the continuing resistence to the MPLA in Angola provides a possible opportunity for by Soviet intervention. Civil war in Nigeria or Guinea, war between South Africa and any or all of her neighbors are others. In the Far East, conflict between Vietnam and Thailand or even the PRC might provide an opportunity for a demonstration of some kind.

The purpose of this speculation is to make the point that there is a level of likely resistence to Soviet intervention in the Third World that falls below that which one would expect from the NATO countries or Japan. And when Soviet limitations are considered, this lower level of resistence reduces the impact of some of the more obvious and commonly reported Soviet deficiencies. Given that the Soviets are convinced that U.S. power projection forces will not be employed directly against them, the level of resistence likely from imaginable Third World targets ranges from nearly nothing to a quite formidable defense, such as that which an industrialized smaller power like South Africa might be able to muster.

a. Limitations in Surprise

The deployment of any Soviet intervention force toward a troublespot seems certain to be detected and likely

to be reported in the world press. "Strategic" surprize, then, seems unattainable without the cooperation of the western intelligence services. But the operation includes the preparation, embarkation, and the transit phases before the landing takes place. If the United States is to oppose the operation it will likely happen in one or more of these phases, and if the landing takes place despite U.S. opposition (political or military) a degree of strategic surprize will result from the change in the "status quo" of relative naval strength discussed above.

The level of tactical surprize possible is quite considerable. There is always a choice of beaches and times and tactics to be made by an amphibious planner, but in the Soviet case the heavy use of air cushion vehicles, VTOL aircraft, LASH and RO-RO ships, and even the Soviet amphibious ships themselves will be virtually without precedent. The British experience in the Falkland Islands war seems like the most obviously analogous operation to an expected Soviet combined arms intervention, but comparisons seem unlikely to be of much use given the different likely military goals, tactics, motivation, etc. The world will be watching the tactics used by the Soviets with the full expectation that they will represent something new in the history of amphibious warfare. Likely victems of Soviet intervention may not include nations or factions with a deep understanding of the military problems of defense against amphibious assault, contributing to the tactical surprize when the attack takes place.

b. Limitations in Air Cover

Perhaps the most common criticism of Soviet power projection capability is the lack of tactrical air cover for the amphibious forces once the borders of the Soviet Union are more than 200 or so miles behind. The

United States builds and deploys large aircraft carriers for this purpose, among others, and is uniquely capable of bringing very large concentrations of accurate firepower to bear up to several hundred miles inland from most shorelines of the world ocean. The Soviets will not have their first comparable carrier until the last decade of this century. Their tactics, moreover, as demonstrated in "anti-NATO" exercises, invariably support amphibious landings with tactical air strikes. How then can a large landing be carried out in the absence of this capability?

A large landing against concentrated NATO or other "first world" forces probably cannot be successfully attempted by the Soviets beyond their land-based tactical air umbrella. But few of the likely Third World interventions contemplated by this analysis would require such massive airpower. And the deployable airpower available to the Soviets in a combined arms operation seems reasonably well suited to the worst case that they might encounter.

The worst likely case is a perhaps a landing against South Africa. This country would almost certainly be isolated from western aid in a major confrontation, but features sophisticated naval, air, and ground forces. The difficulty lies in their number and sustainability. The Soviet ships that we have demonstrated to be available for the protection of the convoy have the most advanced defensive missiles and electronics in the world. The attrition rate of attacking South African aircraft would likely be very high. The South African Air Force would also probably be engaged in multiple front battles with neighboring states at the same time.

Air and naval gunfire support of the landing force would, as a military problem, consist of the destruction of artillery, SAM, armor concentrations, and other support and command targets further inland. The improvement

of the naval guns in the Soviet Navy, in range and rate of fire, effectively moves the area of responsibility of sea-based air support deeper inland, to the rear area targets. Air defense of the landing zone could be provided at medium and high altitudes by naval SAMS of ships offshore. At low altitudes the SA-9s and ZSU-23-4 weapons organic to the SNI forces would be effective if beached early, using ACVs for example, and given adequate early warning of South African aircraft by the advanced command and control assets of the fleet offshore.[51]

The air support deficiency then, in this difficult example, is not an insurmountable problem. Given that the Forger aircraft do not tangle one-on-one with enemy Mirages, sea and land based SAMs provide a significant air defense against a limited number of even very advanced fighter-bombers. This multiple-layered SAM-based air defense is completely consistent with Soviet naval air defense theory, as developed earlier. The problem of providing air support of the ground forces is partially ameliorated by the improved naval guns, and the consequent movement of responsibility for air support inland. More critical, however, is the simple paucity of targets. A Third World intervention, or even this attack on South Africa, is not comparable to a landing in northern Germany or Denmark--there simply won't be as many critical defensive positions to attack. Those that do exist, especially bridges, radars, etc., are most vulnerable to attack with guided weapons, and the Forger is capable of carrying perhaps two guided air-to-ground weapons [Ref. 35: pp. 238-239]. The number of Forger aircraft (normally 12 per

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[51]The Soviet fleet does not at this time have an airborne early warning system like the American E2-C aircraft, but could modify helicopters in the way that the British did after the Falklands war to achieve an interim capability.

"Kiev" class hull) could be increased by the proven expediency of bringing some down to operate off a container ship, as the British did against the Argentines. Firepower could be further increased by flying large "Hind D or E" type helicopters from container ships, or even "Moskva" class cruisers. These helicopters carry various types of guided air-to-ground missiles, rockets, bombs, a gatling gun, plus a fully-equipped squad of eight infantrymen.

Air defense and air support of the ground troops are problems, then, but problems of degree and not prohibitive of intervention on a large scale in a Second or Third World environment.

c. Limitations in Transport

The challenge of demonstrating the transportability of a Soviet interventionary force is a matter first of showing that the lift tonnage exists and would be available, but more importantly to show that the ships are suitable for the task. Can the scenario above be carried out on the shores of South Africa, or Angola, or Ethiopia, or Thailand? Certainly the amphibious lift exists to put a battalion, as in the example, or even as much as a reinforced brigade ashore, using naval infantry equipment from several fleets but dedicated amphibious ships only. For the measurement of the capability to transport and land the ground forces that would follow to carry out the ultimate military goal, our modified "select ship" criteria limits us to those ships capable of putting men ashore at an unimproved beach.

Those merchant ships which must support the landing force while the beach is not yet secured have to be able to disembark combat vehicles directly into the water, and a large fraction of the ships considered above can do that. The RO-ROs feature ramps from which amphibious

vehicles can be driven into the water, and the SEEBEE or LASH ships can do the same or actually operate air cushion vehicles from their wells. This sort of capability seems more pertinent to augmentation of the SNI lift capability than the following ground forces, making it possible to lift SNI forces without decimating local fleet contingency lift capabilities as was done to the Northern Fleet in Zapad-81 (see above).

If a single regiment of SNI is deemed adequate for the task of securing a beachhead, which seems possible in most of the sorts of situations considered here, then the merchant fleet can go about offloading the ground forces in a relatively secure environment, where speed and firepower are not necessary features of the vehicles carrying out the transfer. That is, rather than use these merchant ships in exotic new ways, the barge carriers could use their barges and the RO-ROs or containerships could unload vehicles and cargo onto the barges that had been emptied ashore. If the SNI did their job, command of the air was established, and the beachhead was secure, then the offload can be done in an unopposed environment, with the already present combination of ships and land-based SAMs providing security.

In this environment, several divisions of ground forces could be put ashore in fairly short order, with no amphibious training required, and with little more than half of the available ships of the appropriate types used to support the task. This figure is conservative. Gorshkov's quote at the end of the previous chapter, indicated that a brigade, which is half the size of a division, can be carried by a "Yulius Fuchik" class ship. Each of these two ships "... can offload up to 25,000 tons of cargo in 13 hours without the need for piers." [Ref. 23: p. 416] When the Aleksey Kosygin and the nuclear powered LASH ship, both of which are of similar size, come on line they will

represent roughly two divisions (about 100,000 tons) of cargo capacity all by themselves. The Ro-RO ships that have come on line since 1975 alone represent another 600,000 deadweight tons of capacity [Ref. 24: pp. 545-547]. Of course a well-planned loadout that matches types and densities of cargo to the specific capabilities of the ships could achieve an even better efficiency. For example, the SEEBEE barges each fit eight T-72 tanks line abreast very nicely. Yulius Fuchik or her sister could, with 26 of these, carry 208 tanks or other vehicles while the remaining ships carry lighter, more easily containerized cargo.

Finally, any combat contribution of the airborne forces could and would be supported by Soviet Air Forces' Military Transport Aviation (VTA) operating out of staging bases in previously secured areas, such as Luanda, or Conakry, or Danang. The maximum range of the Il-76 Candid aircraft at maximum payload is 6,300 kilometers, which indicates that the radius of action is adequate to operate from such staging areas to any coastal area of Africa or Asia [Ref. 36: p. 7]. Paratroopers could be evacuated by the amphibious forces after the beachhead was secured, or by VTA aircraft once an airfield was captured or built.

d. Limitations in Command and Control

Soviet capabilities for worldwide naval command and control have improved very dramatically in the past twenty years. The exercises called "Okean" in 1970 and 1975 were the first demonstrations of sophisticated exercises worldwide under the central direction of the naval staff in Moscow. Since then, as pointed out earlier, the "Kirov," "Slava," and "Ivan Rogov" classes have joined the increasing numbers of "Kiev," "Moskva," and "Sverdlov" combatants with very sophisticated command and control equipment. Certain naval auxiliaries are also used as flagships. Given an

environment of non-interference with communications, which seems fair in most of these Third World interventions, there seems to be little doubt that Moscow could maintain a satisfactory level of control over a major operation anywhere on the globe.

IX. CONCLUSION

The goal of this thesis has been to provide some insight into the factors that drive the decisionmaking process when the Soviets are faced with a situation in which direct intervention in a local war is an option. The possibility is often dismissed because there is no history of such direct Soviet military intervention. There is also, perhaps as a consequence, a widely held conventional wisdom that no such mission exists. This analysis pursued the ephemeral basis of that conventional wisdom, both in history and in material capability, and found that a significant and growing possibility of a decision to intervene with Soviet forces exists.

The analytical method was to create an historically-based dynamic context for understanding the way that Soviet decisions are made given an observable level of relative costs and benefits in three categories. Working out the cost-benefit (or risk-gain) factors in the political/ideological, economic, and military categories led to an overview of the ways in which some of these factors have actually come into play over a range of incidents involving Soviet naval response to world crises. Five general trends emerged:

1. U.S. naval forces usually precede Soviet forces to an area of contention.
2. The Soviets have been willing to risk attacks upon their ships and men if the attacker is a pariah and the ally important enough strategically.
3. Innovative tactics have appeared in low-risk situations and are adopted if proven.

4. Large proportions of the ships in a fleet have deployed when the threat (U.S. ships) has also moved away from that home fleet area.
5. Soviet overseas acquisitions have been used aggressively to increase projection capability.

These trends were then placed in the larger context of the stakes that Soviet decisionmakers see from the ideological, economic, and military points of view. The ideological stakes were ultimately seen to be a tool for the justification of action during the coincidence of historic opportunity and strategic necessity. The second and fifth trends above seemed to find their ideological dimension in the fatalistic Soviet acceptance of high risk when the necessity to support Nasser, for example, was absolute, because of the importance of naval and air facilities. Ideology provides a language of commitment for the Soviet Union which may not provide a literal clue to their motivations or perceptions but must be acknowledged for what it is. The economic stakes were on two levels. There was first a positive incentive to intervene when the likelihood of creating a market for arms was significant. Secondly, there was clearly a willingness to enter into a situation with a large negative cash flow in areas where the likelihood of air or naval access was high. The use of these facilities to threaten western trade in an apocalyptic situation has economic dimensions but for our purposes the simple capabilities to forward-deploy and get there first (trend #1) or even already be there (trend #5) seem more pertinent.

The military stakes were seen to be the dominant considerations in Soviet decisions to intervene in local wars, contributing to each of the five trends above. Each of the 19 cases in the historical database was considered in terms of military risks and benefits and a new set of trends was

developed describing the values at stake and the nature of the symbolic "language" of military activity in a crisis. Several new concepts emerged:

1. The communication of Soviet perceptions of "strategic necessity" to potential adversaries (especially the U.S.).
2. The importance of having adequate weaponry for the predictable completion of a military task.
3. Constant positive control of military assets.
4. Maintaining appropriate and consistent levels of commitment.
5. The credible threat of a military response proportional to the level of strategic necessity communicated.

These points, as well as the five earlier trends, were then illustrated in a series of case studies that demonstrated the way these values are communicated in the course of a dynamic naval confrontation.

It was seen that there are patterns of Soviet behavior in Third World crises that can be traced to their motivations and which can be projected when the sense of the Soviet capability to act is accurate. Military capability was seen as the defining parameter, the quantity that determined the answers that the Soviet decisionmakers would reach when they considered whether they should, on their own terms, act credibly and profitably to influence the outcome of a crisis. Capabilities defined the limits of Soviet intentions to act in a given situation.

Finally, the military capabilities pertinent to these Soviet considerations were developed in considerable detail. The ships themselves were described and the military tools actually available when the assets were aggregated at several likely levels of intervention were considered. Some conventional wisdom was challenged and where head counting

was appropriate to test common knowledge it was done. It was seen that with no more imagination than they have exhibited in past exercises and crises it was possible to describe viable Soviet interventionary forces at three likely levels, with known technology and proven tactics.

The limits of Soviet intervention can thus be defined. In a given situation they are described by the capability of Soviet military force to act in an appropriate and proportional way with reserve capability to see various escalation contingencies through to acceptable conclusions. This powerful and versitile level of force is coming to be available for the Soviet Union. Against the United States naval task groups that have historically preempted their involvement and against the likely range of Third World targets, the Soviet fleet is increasingly capable of presenting a legitimate threat. An aggressive military posture has proven itself to be directly effective for the task at hand, and indirectly valuable by contributing to the strength and types of military influence to be applied in the future. Thus the rational factors contributing to the Soviet decision seem to indicate a strong possibility of greater direct Soviet naval involvement in local wars.

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
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